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PREFACE
The National Commission for Employaent Policy has been studying issues
related to computers in the workplace, and will soon publish a Policy.
Statement with an accompanying staff background report. The present paper
1s one of a .eries of research reports that have been published a. part of
this project. The C~s.lon i8 happy to have joined with the Panel on
Technology and Wo.en '8 !aployaent of the National R.ilearch Council in
supporting this report, as well as the authors' earlier report on linking
data on e1lq)1oyaent with data on technological change. The Commission
thanks the Panel, and especially its Chair, Professor Louise Tilly, and
Study Director, Dr. Beidi Bartmann, for their cooperation in this effort.
The Commission also thanks the authors, Dr:. H. Allan Hunt and Dr.
Timothy L. Hunt', for their ca~eful sifting of the available evidence on how
technological change alters patterns of cle.rical employaent. They have
drawn some important conclu_ioGs regarding research ..thods, and also
regarding the li1D.1ts of policy and prediction. Their position 1D.1ght be
called knowledgeable agnostici... They'find "no persuasive evidence today
that there will be a significant decline in clerical jobs in the future."
(p.65) They caution, however, that the vast uncertainty surrounding
technological change makes long term prediction of limited value to
planners and policymakers.
In their review of Bureau of Labor Statistics studies, Hunt and Hunt
conclude that the occupational projections are produced in a comprehensive
and cODsistent way, although saaevbat .ore explicit informa~ion on
adjustment procedures would be desirable as an aid to evaluation. Hunt and
Hunt also review three projection studies by university-based researchers.
They applaud the detail prOVided on the a8suaptions and procedures
underlying these studies, even though they disagree with many of the
specific conclusions. It should be noted that the three independent
studies were sponsored by Federal agencies. This underlines the key role
of the Federal government in supporting basic research on technological
change.
The series of Commission-sponsored report~ on computers in the
workplace was designed by the Ca-is810n project staff: Carol Ju'senius
Romero, team leader; Sara B. Toye and Stephen E. Baldwin. ' This team worked
closely With the authors in organizing this study; however, the information
presented and the conclusions drawn do not. necessarily reflect the views of
the Commission or its staff.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
CLERICAL EMPLOYMENT AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE:
A REVIEW OF RECENT TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS
,by
H. Allan Hun:t and Ti'mothy L. Hunt*
,I. INTRODUCTION
Clerical jobs are the largest single occupational group in the economy;
they are also one of the most diverse. Generally people associate the
traditional office occupations with the term clerical workers. Indeed, the
secretaries, typists, stenographers, file clerks, office machine operators and
receptionists do make up a large proportion of all clerical workers. But
bookkeepers and bank tellers are also clerical workers according to the U.S.
Bureau of the Census, as are bill collectors, insurance adjusters, post office
mail carriers, factory expediters, and most enumerators. The purpose of this
paper is to review the trends in clerical employment over the last 30 years and
to assess the existing forecasts for clerical jobs. ' Of particular concern is
the potential impact of office automation on these jobs.
In summary, we found no persuasive evidence that there will be a
significant decline in clerical jobs in the future. The forecasts of declining
clerical employment are based on overoptimistic expectations of technological
improvements or exaggerated productivity claims on behalf of existing
technology. In our opinion, current office technology -offers significant
improvements in product quality and modest-improvements in productivity. There
is as yet no empirical evidence of an office productivity revolution that will
displace significant 'numbers of clerical workers.
On the contrary, we think there are many factors which will contribute to
the job growth of clericals in the future. Chief among these is the simple
fact that clericals are so diffused in the national economy. Moreover, to the
extent that clerical jobs are concentrated in particular industries, it has
been in sectors growing faster than average. Therefore, even allowing for
negative employment impacts from office automation, it is extremely difficult
to believe that the growth of this large, diverse, and diffused major
occupational group could. be much below the average growth for all occupations
for the next decade.
*Manager of Research and S~nior Research Economist respectively, W. E. Upjohn
Institute for Employment Research, 300 South Westnedge, Kalamazoo, Michigan
49007. Facts and observations presented in this document are the sole
responsibility of the authors. Th~ viewpoints do not necessarily represent
positions of the W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
2. There are precious few hard data on which to base an assessment of clericaljobs and office automation. Data are not available on yearly office automation
spending by industry or even detailed clerical employment by industry. The
existing data are so fragmentary and so uneven that conclusions drawn from them
must be somewhat tenuous. It is easy to use data which look similar on the
surface and end up drawing inferences which reflect nothing more than
differences in measurement.
Every effort has been made to insure that the data reported in this paper
are reasonably consistent. Undoubtedly, some will object that time series data
were not developed for enough clerical occupations or that the analysis ends
with 1982 in some cases. Suffice it to say that the goal was to avoid
reporting results which might be misleading, but yet to get as much from
existing data sources as possible.
II. TRENDS IN CLERICAL EMPLOYMENT
The tremendous growth in the number and labor force share of clerical
workers in the U.S. is well known. In 1940, just under one employee in ten was
a clerical worker. By 1980, this proportion had risen to one in five, a
doubling of the relative importance of clerical workers. One of the most
stimulating questions about the future employment outlook is whether this trend
will continue.
Those who expect that automation will stem the tide of growth in clerical
employment cite. the apparent reduction in the rate of increase in the
proportion of clerical workers. The rate of increase of clerical workers
relative to all employment was much slower in the 1970s than it was in the
19605. The recess·ion of 1980-82 was unique.in that the proportion of clericaljobs in total employment did not increase significantly as it has in past
recessions. Whether the trend of the early 180s is permanent remains to be
seen.
There were just over 19 million clerical workers employed in 1980 (using
consistent 1970 definitions of occupations). Collectively, clerical workers
represented 19.6 percent of all employed persons in 1980, up from only 12
percent in 1950. Most clerical workers are women, and this is even more true
today than it was 30 years ago. From just over 60 percent in 1950, the female
proportion has grown to nearly 80 percent by 1980. It is also true that a
rising percentage of women who are employed outside the home are employed as
clerical workers. In 1950, about 27 percent of employed women worked in
clerical jobs'. By 1980, over 35 percent of all women who were gainfully
employed outside the home worked at clerical jobs. Clearly, clerical jobs are
predominantly female jobs.
The largest sin91e category of clerical workers in 1980 was secretaries.
There were over 4 m,llion secretaries employed; they represented just over 4
perc~nt of total employment and 21 percent of clerical employment in that
year. The second biggest category was bookkeepers, with about 1.8 million
employed, followed by' cashiers, with 1.7 million. The only o~her clerical
occupation that has approached 1 million employees is typists. All together,
3these "big four" clerical occupations accounted for 8.5 million jobs, or about
45 percent of all clerical employment in 1980. It is interesting to note that
these same four occupations only accounted for 27 percent of clerical
employment in 1950. All four of these occupations have grown substantially in
employment during the last 30 years, although the number of typists declined
between 1970 and 1980.
On the other end of the scale in terms of size, there were only about 3,300
tabulating machine operators and about 7,600 telegraph operators employed in
1980. These occupations have been declining for some years, as have the next
two smallest occupations, duplicating machine operators and calculating machine
operators. Each of these occupations has been adversely impacted by changes in
technology.
Computer and peripheral equipment operators far exceeded all other clerical
occupations in their rate of increase over this period. This occupation has
grown from an .emp10yment level of 868 persons in 1950 at the dawn of the
computer age to over 400,000 persons in 1980, an annual rate of growth of over
22 percent. This is one labor market expression of the computer revolution,
which began to substantially affect employment levels in computer-related
occupations in the 19605.
It is interesting to note that the second fastest growing clerical
occupation over the 1950 to 1980 period was teachers' aides; from high-tech to
high-touch in one easy step~ The number of teachers· aides increased from
6,000 to over 200,000 in this 30-year period, or over 12 percent per year. The
third fastest growing clerical occupation was typists, even with their 23
percent decline in employment from 1970 to 1980. The phenomenal growth of
typists in the 1950s and'1960s was not fully offset by the recent reversals.
Following in order of rate of growth are library attendants, clerical
supervisors, bank tellers, receptionists, and cashiers.
With the spectacular exception of the computer operator category, the rapid
growth jobs do not show any particular high-technology bent. On the other
hand, the declining occupations do seem to offer a technological
interpretation, at least in part. It is clear that the bulk of clerical
employment is in a few very large, very diffuse occupational titles, such as
secretary and bookkeeper. This was less true in 1950 than in 1980. The
evolution of office technology over the last 30 years may have fostered more
generality in job title and perhaps job content as well, but the existing data
do not permit a test of this hypothesis.
In general, the analysis of employment in specific occupations yielded few
results.' The amazing variety of clerical jobs was depicted, and the diversity
in their employment trends clearly emerged from the analysis. But the trends
in employment proved to be very difficult to tie conclusively to technological
change or any other single cause. The general conclusion was that an aggregate
analysis of occupational employment data is not sufficient to reveal the causes
behind the trends.
4Thus, it is necessary to look beyond the number of workers in a specific
occupation to determine what might be causing those movements. It is also
critical to put clerical employment growth into some larger perspective. These
objectives were accomplished by decomposing occupational employment changes
into three components: (1) those due to overall economic growth, (2) those due
to differences in the rates of growth of industries (the changing sectoral
co~osition of output), and (3) those due to changing staffing ratios or the
relative importance of clerical workers within individual industries.
The general health of the econo~ exerts the strongest influence on the
employment in individual occupations. With sufficient growth in total demand,
employment in most occupations will surely rise. Therefore, it should not be
surprising to learn that about 3 million of the 4 million new clerical jobs
from 1972 to 1982 were added as a consequence of the overall growth of the
economy.
There is wide variance in the proportion of clerical employment in
different industries, with the largest concentrations being in the service
sector~ Obviously, to the extent that any occupation is concentrated in fast
growing industries, it will also tend to be fast growing. Thus, in the long
run there is no doubt that the evolution of the service econo~ has favorably
influenced clerical employment levels. From 1972 to 1982 about 600,000 net
clerical jobs were added because clerical workers were more prevalent in
industries that were growing faster than the average for all industries.
Changing staffing ratios are probably the most visible manifestation of the
specific effects of technological change on occupational employment. If the
net effect of office automation is the displacement of clerical jobs, clerical
staffing ratios will fall over time as clerical workers become relatively less
important in the total employment of the f1~s. But staffing ratios may change
for other reasons and the broad occupational and industrial groupings used in
this analysis may mask the true changes which are occurring at more
disaggregated levels.
Nevertheless, the aggregate analysis of this study indicated that the net
effect of changing staffing ratios was moderately positive from 1972 to 1982,
creating at most 450,000 new clerical jobs. Given the rapid growth in clericaljobs over the last 30 years or so, it appears reasonable to conclude that many
goods and services have been growing more information-intensive per unit of
output over time. This has tended to boost clerical employment.
Although the net effect of changing staffing ratios on clerical employment
was modestly positive across all industries, there were a few sectors, notably
finance, where the effect was negative. This is taken as evidence of the
adverse impact of technological change on clerical employment. Even in
finance, however, the strong industry mix effect and overall economic growth
dwarfed the negative staffing ratio effect by a margin of more than 6 to 1. So
employment of clericals continued to rise significantly despite the impact of
a~tomation.
5In brief, clerical workers have had a favorable industry mix in their
employment pattern, benefiting from the shift toward finance and other
service-related industries because those industries employ much higher
proportions of clerical workers. Furthermore, the relative importance of
clerical jobs has tended to rise within industries. Thus in the past all the
factors have tended to be positive and the result has been spectacular growth
in clerical employment.
The attempt to find direct empirical evidence on the productivity gains
from office automation met with little success. What is available consists
mostly of undocumented trade journal articles rather than sound empirical
research. It was shown that the measured industry-wide productivity gains in
finance and insurance did not support the thesis that office automation was
having a significant impact. Yet it is a fact that investment in this sector
has been dramatically higher than the historical average for that sector for
the last 15 years, so this lack of measured productivity results remains a
puzzle.
III. THE FORECASTS OF CLERICAL EMPLOYMENT
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) occupational projections are the major
effort of the U.S. government to anticipate the needs for specific
occupations. The BLS methodology is based on a modeling framework that
accounts for many economic variables. The resulting occupational projections
are not necessarily superior to others but they do have the advantage of being
produced in a comprehensive and reasonably consistent manner.
The other forecasts of clerical employment growth are not nearly as
comprehensive as that of the BLS. Wassily Leontief and Faye Duchin of New York
University analyze the impacts of computer automation on employment, 1963-2000,
focusing on certain modeling questions and to a much lesser extent, the
technology assessment. The research is limited to certain specified computer
technologies and does not consider other productivity enhancing technologies or
any other source of productivity growth. J. David Roessner, Georgia Institute .
of Technology, examines clerical jobs in two industries, banking and insurance,
concentrating on the technology forecast and its relationship to job tasks or
functions. Roessner develops the job functions in such a way that they are
independent of the technologies currently in use. Finally, Matthew P. Drennan
of Columbia University looks at clerical employment in six industries. His
projection methodology utilizes extrapolation of historical trends after
accounting for the effects of the 1980-82. recession.
The existing forecasts of employment in clerical occupations are unanimous
in predicting that staffing ratios for clerical jobs will fall in the years
ahead, presumably due to office automation. The fall in staffing ratios
anticipated by BLS is modest and will be just about offset by employment growth
due to the favorable industry mix of clerical jobs. So the BLS anticipates
average growth for clerical jobs. Still, it is significant that the only
turnaround from historical trends anticipated by BLS at the major occupational
group level due to changing staffing ratios is that for clerical workers. At
least through 19~2, the decomposition analysis discussed earlier showed that
6the staffing ratios for clerical jobs were rising, whereas the BLS forecast(base year 1982) and other forecasts expect that this trend will be reversed in
the years ahead.
. Roessner, Drennan, and Leontief-Duchin all conclude that office automation
will have a much greater impact on clerical jobs than the BLS predicts.
Roessner is particularly pointed about his concerns regarding the BLS
methodology and forecasts, while Drennan's projections appear to be nearer the
BL5 posf·tion. Unfortunately, we find the studies of Leontief-Duchin and
Roessner to be seriously flawed for serving policy needs. This 1s not an
unqualified endorsement of the methodology or projections of BLS or Drennan.
But it does mean that we think that Leontief-Duchin and Roessner are unduly
pessimistic about the outlook for clerical jobs.
There are a variety of reasons that support our contention. First, it is
important to note that Leontief-Duchin actually use the BLS demand forecast in
their research, whereas both Drennan and Roessner use simple extrapolation
methods to obtain estimates of demand for their studies. What this means is
that demand for final goods and services is assumed to grow as it has in the
past or as anticipated by BLS, but the impacts of technological change (i.e.,
office automation) will be much different than they were previously. The
revolution in office automation is assumed to leave the demand side of the
marketplace unchanged.
But that is not the way a complex, dynamic market economy operates. If
office automation were adopted rapidly, it would change the relative costs of
production for those goods and services which are intensive users of office
automation. Those lower production costs will generate lower prices. Since
office work is concentrated in the service sector, where demand growth has been
above ave-rage, there i s every reason to thi nk that both the lower prices and
income growth over time will generate additional demand.
This scenario is even more plausible when one realizes that the product
markets themselves are not static. 50 the new electronic office technologies
may themselves provide the impetus for the development of entirely new goods
and services. Indust~ interrelationships may change or scale economies may be
so significant that they fuel the development of a mass market that heretofore
was undreamed of. In our opinion it is inappropriate to fix demand or the
growth of demand and then assume a revolutionary change on the supply side of
the ma~ket. Obviously, such a partial analysis can create false impressions
about the true impacts of office automation.
Second, it appears that none of these other studies account for the
tendency of output to become more infonnat1on-intensive over- time. Yet this is
a process which has been occurring for a long time. The production recipes for
many different goods and services today require more information processing
than yesterday. This is not simply a function of the changing composition of
demand, but relates to the composition of a standard unit of output. To the
extent that this trend continues in the future, ft implies that office
automation may have less impact on clerical employment levels than anticipated
by some researchers. '
7Third, these studies do not account for the fact that the new technologies
must be cost-effective and relatively reliable for widespread applicatfon. The
technologies may appear to be costless, producing quantum leaps in productivity
for the users. Yet there are purchase costs, installation costs and ongoing
costs that must be accounted for. The ongoing costs include system
maintenance, software development and training, among others. There is also
the cost of unscheduled downtime, which may become even more significant with
integrated systems.
Fourth, it should be mentioned that office automation is likely to lower
the marginal cost of some new types of work so much that the required labor
input rises by more than the impact of the new techniques themselves. The
common example is redrafts of documents with word processing. The probability
that this will occur may be enhanced by our inability to measure output from·
offices in the first place. This type of new work or rework is explicitly
rejected by Leontief-Duchin, and perhaps implicitly by Roessner.
Finally, Leontief-Duchin and Roessner appear to us to be truly
overoptimistic technologically, both in tenms of what office automation
equipment can do and in the speed of diffusion of that equipment.
Leontief-Duchin assume that word processors alone will produce producti~ity
gains for typists and secretaries of 500 percent. Yet this assumption' is based
upon a short, unauthored trade journal article which is fives times more
optimistic than the other articles which Leontief-Duchin reference. Roessner,
on the other hand, emphasi zes the potenti.al for two breakthrough techno1 ogi es,
voice input and artificial intelligence. He assumes that innovations will
occur in these technologies in the years ahead, they will be successfully
marketed, and they will dramatically reduce clerical employment in banking and
insurance during the 1990s~
Our major complaint with the technological assumptions of both .
Leontief-Duchin and Roessner is not that they may be technically wrong,
although there is ample reason to question them, but that the level of
uncertainty about the technical forecast is so great that interpretation of the
occupational employment forecasts which are derived from it becomes little more
than an academic exercise. Does anyone seriously wish to base policy decislons
on a forecast o.f the capabilities of artificial intelligence, a technology
which has been kicking around research labs since the 1950s? Perhaps we will
always be optimistic about new technologies; it seems to be part of the human
condition. But that is no justification to shape public policy based on our
dreams of the future.
Suffice it to say that we are unconvinced that technology will evolve as.
far or as fast as Leontief-Duchin and Roessner predict. But even if it does,
the derivative employment impacts foreseen by these researchers may still be
very far off the mark. The overgeneralization to broad employment impacts
based on assumptions about labor productivity at the task or firm level is very
dangerous. This is the kind of analysis that leads to the fear that we will
experience massive technological unemployment at some point in the future.
Various analysts have been predicting such an event at least since the dawn of
the industrial age. Somehow the employment apocalypse is alw~s.just ahead,
8yet thankfully we never quite reach it. In any event, when evaluating these
studies it is important to remember that the model simply processes the
technological assumptions about the econo~. It is the technological
assumptions that drive the employment impacts in these .studies.
Because of the uncertainties about future demand and the capabilities of .
future technologies, we would encourage a focus on shorter range occupational·
forecasting, exactly the opposite approach being suggested by Leontief-Duchin
and Roessner. Roessner says that public policymakers need a longer time period
for planning. But, if technological change is occurring ~aster today, then it
is becoming even more impossible to develop long~run employment forecasts. .
Surely it is folly to think that we can peer 15 to 20 years into the future and
see the detailed occupational and industrial structure of this nation. In .
fact, we think that the current BLS efforts, which produce about a lO-year
planning horizon, tax existing forecasting abilities to the limit.
IV. THE OUTLOOK FOR CLERICAL EMPLOYMENT
What has this review shown for the future of clerical jobs? First, we
think the pessimists are wrong who claim that these jobs will either stop
growing absolutely or actually decline. The forces of economic growth, the
shift toward services, the current limitations of office automation'
technologies all argue strongly against this scenario.
However, it is clear that the historical rate of growth of clerical jobs
has slowed. Clericals did not benefit from the last recession as they have in
earlier recessions, nor are some of the sectors that are important employers of
clericals growing as fast as they once were. Finally, although office
automation may not be producing a revolution, it should at least contribute to
the slowing of employment growth in these occupations in the future. We think
that the overall growth of clerical jobs in the future w1llbe average to
slightly below average.
The common wisdom today is that the back office jobs will go away. We
think this is a glittering generality, but there is an analogy to manufacturing
which may be useful. Automation has not caused the total elimination of
production workers in manufacturing, but these jobs have not been increasing in
absolute terms for 40 years either. We think the so-called back office jobs
are more threatened by automation than other positions. They share with
production workers a routinization of tasks which tends to support automation.
This will not necessarily lead to their demise, but their growth will probably
be well below average.
As mentioned earlier, it is definitely much easier to provide a
technological explanation for declining occupations than gro-nng occupations.
There is an important message here. It is far easier to identify the impacts
of labor-saving technology than the new jobs which are created by a growing,
dynamic economy. Technology is only one aspect of economic growth, whereas the
examination of the potential job losses is much more narrow and focused.
9Many people today are ready to add bank tellers to the list of declining
occupations. Unfortunately tellers is one of the occupations for which the
time series data are especially poor, but it does appear that the growth of
this occupation has slowed in recent years. It also appears that to some
extent the future growth prospects for bank tellers is directly tied to the
public's acceptance of automatic teller machines. But these machines today are
being used mostly for withdrawals and cannot be thought of as a substitute for
a fully staffed bank. Furthermore, it is difficult to know if and when the
pUblic will be willing to break the human link in making banking transactions.
Asa result, the future for bank tellers is extremely cloudY.
Secretaries fall somewhere between the back-office jobs and those positions
which involve considerable customer interface. Therefore, secretarial
employment growth may slow but these jobs will not go away. It is also true
that many of these positions are generalist in nature and more difficult to
threaten with automation. It seems clear that the secretaries of the future
will require a greater variety of skills and will utilize much more capital
equipment. We think that the growth of secretaries will be average to below
average, but the absolute number of these jobs will definitely increase.
Roessner notwithstanding, we think that the growth of technology positions
will continue to be rapid, particularly computer-related positions. Office
automation is not sufficiently advanced at this point to slow the growth of
these jobs. It remains to be seen if that will ever occur. We also think that
those clerical positions which require the worker to deal with customers will
likely experience average- growth or better. Except possibly for bank tellers,
there appears to be more emphasis on customer service and the quality of that
service. The office of the future will require both "high-tech" and
"high-touch."
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CLERICAL EMPLOYMENT AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE:
A REVIEW OF RECENT TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
Clerical jobs are the largest single occupational group in the econo~,
they are also one of the most diverse. Generally people associate the
traditional office occupations with the term clerical workers. Indeed, the
secretaries, typists, stenographers, file clerks, office machine operators and
receptionists do make up a large proportion of all clerical workers. But
bookkeepers and bank tellers are also clerical workers according to the U.S.
Bureau of the Census, as are bill collectors, insurance adjusters, post office
mail carriers, factory expediters, and most enumerators and interviewers.
The tremendous growth in the number of clerical workers in the U.S. is well
known. But the true magnitude· of this expansion cannot be appreciated without
comparing it to the growth in total employment. Figure 1.A shows that the
proportion of clerical workers in total employment has doubled in the last 40
years. In 1940, just under one employee in ten was a clerical worker. By
1980, this proportion had risen to one in five.[l] One of the most puzzling
questions about future employment is whether this trend will continue. Such
questions derive from the general recessionary conditions of the last five
years, but they also arise in the face of the developments of the last ten
years or so in office technology.
The first "computer revolution" in the 1960s was expected to impact
clerical work adversely as well. Despite the fact that the dire consequences
predicted by same for clerical worker employment in the 1960s did not
materialize, these fears have been aroused again in the 1980s. Those who are
convinced that this time the fears are well-founded base their case primarily
on the introduction to the office of microprocessor-based technologies. The
incredible reductions in the cost of computing power, combined with the
reductions in bulk made possible by microprocessor technology, may possibly
constitute a new revolutionary development.
Those who expect that automation will stem the tide of growth in clerical
employment cite the apparent reduction in the rate of increase in the
proportion of clerical workers. This can be seen in Figure 1.A as well. While
. the clerical proportion rose almost linearly from 1940 to 1970, there is a
slight reduction in the rate of increase between 1970 and 1980. Is this the
beginning of the end of clerical employment growth?
1. These data have been adjusted rather extensively for consistency. Thus the
figures reported here do not correspond exactly with Census figures from other
sources. See Hunt and Hunt (1986) chapter 2 for a complete discussion of
Census consistency problems and the methods used to overcome these problems.
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Figure 1.8 shows clerical employment as a proportion of total employment on
an annual basis from 1958 to 1984. When total employment declines and clerical
employment rises, the proportion clerical rises very rapidly as indicated in
Figure 1.8 for 1975. What is obvious in Figure 1.8 is that the rate of
increase of clerical workers relative to all employment was much slower in the
1970s than it was in the 1960s.[2]
What is even more apparent is the stagnation in the proportion of clerical
workers since 1980. Clearly, clerical workers have not fared as well in the
last recessionary period as they did earlier. It is less clear what the
downturn in the clerical proportion in 1984 means. Such a decline has been
typical of recovery periods in the past (as in 1976-77) when the number of
production workers rises rapidly to restore the prerecession balance between
production and non-production workers, including clericals. Whether the trend
of the early 1980s is something different is not yet clear. The magnitude of
the drop is unprecedented, but that does not prove the cause is fundamentally
different.
The last issue to be discussed in this introduction is the extent to which
clerical jobs are also female jobs. Is it a coincidence that the expansion of
clerical employment occurred simultaneously with the expansion of female labor
force participation rates? To what extent have female job opportunities been
linked to the expansion of the clerical work force?
Figur~ 1.C shows that the overwhelming majority of clerical workers are in
fact female, and that this is even more true today than it was 30 years ago:
From just over 60 percent female in 1950, the proportion grew to nearly 80
percent by 1980. A closer examination of individual occupations later will
show that this reflects the relative growth trends among clerical jobs as well
as the increasing supply of female labor. But it is clear that clerical jobs
are more than ever women's jobs.
Figure 1.0 demonstrates that the obverse is also true. A growing
proportion of females who are employed outside the home are employed as
clerical workers. In 1950, about 27 percent of employed females worked in
clerical jobs. 8y 1970, over 35 percent of females were employed as clerical
workers. Thus, the sex-segregation of clerical occupations appears to have
been increasing. This trend may have abated somewhat during the 1970s since
there was very little increase in the proportion of females employed as
clerical workers between 1970 and 1980.[3] Nevertheless, in 1980 over 35
2. The apparent drop in 1971 should be ignored as it reflects the conversion
to new Census codes rather than any actual change in clerical employment
levels.
3. See Reskin and Hartmann (1985) for a discussion of sex segregation on thejob.
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percent of all females who were gainfully employed outside the home worked at
clerical jobs. This contrasts very strongly with the overall figure of about
20 percent of all employees presented earlier. Clearly, clerical jobs are
predominantly female jobs and females are much more likely than males to work
as clerical workers.
Plan of Presentation
This report reviews trends in clerical employment over the last 30 years
and looks for evidence of the impact of changes in process technology on those
trends. Section II specifically reviews clerical employment trends from 1950
to 1980, and from 1972 to 1982.[4] This period encompasses the introduction of
mainframe computers to the office as well as the beginnings of the
microcomputer age. Thus one can interpret the review as an indirect search for
the employment effects of technological change. If changing office
technologies displaced large number of clerical workers during the first
computer revolution, the evidence should be in the employment record of the
1960's and 1970's. Similarly, if the current office technologies threaten
clerical jobs, some evidence of this should be found in the employment figures
of the -early 1980's. Hopefully, this analysis will aid in assessing the
likelihood of significant displacement among current clerical .workers
accompanying the introduction of ~e new microprocessor-based offica
technologies of the future.
The third section of the paper discusses the determinants of clerical
employment in the broadest sense. The influence of industry occupational
structure and industry employment trends on clerical employment totals are
examined. The aggregate change in clerical employment from 1972 to 1982 is
decomposed into portions due to general economic growth, changes in the
sectoral composition of the econo~, and changes in occupational staffing
patterns. Evidence of the direct impact of technological change on office
employment levels is sought for the finance and insurance industry, reputedly
the most advanced user of office automation systems.
A review of existing forecasts of clerical employment is offered in the
fourth section. The obvious purpose is to provide information about other
researchers' expectations about clerical employment trends. But it also
provides an opportunity to examine the way in which assumptions about
technological change and its future employment impacts have shaped those
employment forecasts.
This report does not try to assess the influence of other important factors
that will determine future labor market outcomes for clerical workers. In
particular, there is no consideration of future supply issues. If female labor
force participation rates continue to rise as they have in the past, the issue
4. A much more thorough review of existing data is provided in Hunt and Hunt(1986) chapters 2 and 3.
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of job creation for women will be of even greater significance. On the other
hand, if women increase their penetration of non-traditional female
occupations, the number of females seeking clerical positions in the future may
decline. Whether men are more likely to begin to look to clerical positions
for career opportunities in the future presumably depends on labor market
developments for clericals, as well as the job outlook in more traditional male
occupations. [5]
Clearly these considerations are crucial to understanding whether the
supply and demand of clerical workers will be in approximate balance in the
labor market of the future, but these questions are beyond the scope of the
present effort. We seek only to (1) illuminate past trends in clerical
employment, (2) investigate the causes behind those trends, and (3) evaluate
existing clerical employment forecasts. Throughout the analysis we will be
searching for an understanding of the employment implications of technological
change for clerical workers. It is hoped that this critique and systematic
review of what ;s known about past clerical employment trends will help to
narrow the range of uncertainty about the probable future impact of
technological change on the demand for clerical employment.
5. Many of these issues are addressed in Technology and Women's E~loxwont,
Report of the Panel on Technology and Women's Employment, Committee on omen's
Employment and Related Social Issues, National Research Council to be published
in 1986.
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II. CLERICAL EMPLOYMENT TRENDS
A. Introduction to the Data
The Decennial Census produces the most detailed occupational employment
data that are available from household reporting. This reflects the extremely
large number of observations that are available. Even though the detailed
occupational employment data come from a sub-sample of all Census respondents,
the numbers are still very large by no~l sampling standards. However, even
large numbers of responses cannot obviate the inevitable measurement problems
when dealing with occupational information.[6]
Comparisons among Census observatio~s are further complicated by the
serious problems with the measuring rod', the occupational classification
system. In 1950, occupational employment was tabulated in 12 major groups and
469 detailed occupational categories. In 1960 the same 12 major groups
contained 494 detailed occupations, in 1970 there were only 417 detailed
occupations but still accumulated into 12 major occupational groups. The
overall changes in the classification system can be regarded as relatively
minor over this period. With regard to individual occupations, there can be
major distortions when an occupational category is added or deleted. Sometimes
the slack is taken up by the ubiquitous "not elsewhere classified" or "nec. 11
But on other occasions there are major changes in the coverage of particular
occupational titles.
When it comes to the 1980 Census data, the magnitude of the differences in
the occupational coding system are astounding. There are 503 detailed
occupations which have been reshuffled into 13 new mljor groups, a.nd the lack
of comparability is very serious indeed. For example, cashiers have always
been regarded as clerical workers in the Census occupational classification
schema. The 1980 Census system, however, reclassifies them as sales workers,
thereby moving 1.65 million workers from one major occupational group to
another. Clearly this seriously complicates the task of comparing the
employment levels of both sales workers and clerical workers to their
historical antecedents. Similar transfers occurred for legal aides and counter
clerks among clerical occupations. For the first time, there is a fundamental
lack of consistency at the major occupational group level between adjacent
Census observations.
To avoid being misled by these measurement problems, it is necessary to
convert all occupational employment numbers to a consistent basis. Upon the
advice of the U.S. Bureau of the Census, the classification system of 1970 was
chosen as the standard for this analysis. Since the Bureau of the Census·
6. These issues are discussed more fully in Hunt and Hunt (1986) chapter 2.
This review of clerical employment trends is shortened considerably from that
in Hunt and Hunt (1986) chapters 2 and 3.
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always publishes detailed occupational employment for the last Census and the
current one using current definitions. this means that the comparison between
1960 and 1970 employment in te~s of the 1910 classifications was readily
available.[7]
These data are developed by the Bureau of the Census through a dual
classification of a sample of all household units. Thus the proportions of
those whose occupation would have moved them from anyone detailed occupational
group to another can be estimated. After each Decennial Census. such a
reclassification study is conducted as a part of the bench..rking to Census
observations and the results are published in a Technical Paper.[8]
With painstaking effort it is possible to bridge from one Decennial Census
to the next using these estimates of the proportions in each occupational
category that moved to another category. It should be mentioned that it was
also necessary to standardize the treatment of the "occupation not reported"
group across the various Census observations. The numbers reported here
include allocation of the occupation not reported group to the detailed
occupational level as was done by the Census in 1980. Adjustments were not
made for the deletion of 14- and 15-year olds from the labor force beginning in
1970. nor for the fact that the 1960 to 1970 conversion factors published were
based on the experienced civilian labor force rather than the numer of
individuals employed.[9]
Because of the wide discrepancies between the 1980 occupational
classification system and all those that went before, it is not possible to be
completely accurate in reclassifying all occupational e~plQyment into 1980
terms without special reclassification studies for each pair of Census
observations (i.e•• 1950-1980. 1960-1980. 1970-1980). However, it is possible
to use the unpublished Census numbers to estimate the 1980 employment in tenns
of 1970 Census categories. Of course. it should be understood that all of the
reclassification work is done on the basis of sample results. Thus the
reclassified employment figures are subject both to the original sampling error
7. See 1970 Census of Population. Detailed Characteristics. United States
Summary PC(l)-Dl, Table 221. pp. 718-724.
8. See John A. Priebe. Joan Heinkel. and Stanley Greene. ·1970 OCcupation and
Industry Classification Systems in Te~s of Their 1960 Occupation and Industry
Elements~H Technical Paper No. 26.1ssued July 1972. Washington. D.C.: U.S.
Department of Connerce. Bureau of the Census. The 1950 to 1960 conversion was
pUblished as Technical Paper No. 18. Unfortunately. the 1970 to 1980
conversion has not yet been published. The Bureau of the Census was good
enough to make preliminary unpUblished results available for this study.
9. Neither of these factors are thought to introduce serious distortions in
clerical worker employment figures. In any event there is no information
available with which to make the adjustments at the specific occupational
level.
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in estimating occupational employment and the secondary sampling error involved
in the reclassification study.
The 1950 Census employment coul d not be converted di rect1y ;·nto 1970
categories since no such reclassification study has ever been done. Therefore
the 1950 occupational employment figures were first reclassified into 1960
terms; then those numbers were converted to a 1970 basis using the 1960 to 1970
translation. Suffice it to say that while the numbers reported here were
derived as carefully as possible from the information available, it is not
clear precisely how accurate they may be.
B. Census Employment from 1950 to 1980
The numbers reported in Table 2.1 represent the best derivable estimates of
detailed clerical employment on a consistent basis across the 1950 to 1980 time
span. They are far from perfect, but everything that can be done has been done
to maximize the consistency of the estimates and thereby minimize the
distortions introduced by the measurement system itself.
Table 2.1 shows that there were just over 19 million clerical workers
employed in 1980 (using the consistent 1970 definitions). Employment levels
for 1950, 1960, 1970, and 1980 are indicated for 42 separate clerical
occupations ranging from secretary, the largest, to tabulating machine
operator, the smallest. Collectively, clerical workers represented 19.6
percent of all employed persons in 1980, up from only 12 percent in 1950.
Table 2.1 reports the individual clerical occupations ranked from largest to
smallest according to their le.ve1 of employment in 1980. The largest single
category of clerical workers in 1980 was secretaries. There were over 4
million secretaries employed; they represented just over 4 percent of total
emp'loyment and 21 percent of clerical employment in that year.
The second biggest category was bookkeepers, with about 1.8 million
employed, followed by cashiers, with 1.7 million. The only other clerical
occupation that has approached 1 million employees is typists. All together,
these "big four" clerical occupations accounted for 8.5 million jobs, or about
45 percent of all clerical employment in 1980. It is interesting to note ~hat
these same four occupations only accounted for 27 percent of clerical
employment in 1950. All four of these occupations have grown substantially in
employment during the last 30 years, although typists declined between 1970 and
1980.
On the other end of the scale in terms of size, there were only about 3,300
tabulating machine operators and about 7,600 telegraph operators employed in .
1980. These occupations have been declining for some years, as have the next
two smallest occ'upations, duplicating machine operators and calculating machine
operators. Each of these occupations has been adversely impacted by changes in
technology.
Table 2.1
Employment in Qerical Occupations, 1950 to 1980
Ranked by Level of Employment in 1980
Employment
Occupational title 1950 1960 1970 1988
Total employment •.•••.••••••••.••••• · .••• · · · . 57,171.206 64,639,256 76,553,599 97,639,355
Clerical workers ............................... 6,875,546 9,575.247 13,856.074 19,119,280
Secretaries ........... 0 •••••••••••••••••••••• 1,005,968 1,539,017 2,875,826 4,058,1.82
Not specified clerical workers •......•.•..•... 0. 1,185,906 1,610,020 862.394 1,880,102
Bookkeepers ........... 0 •••••••••••••••••••• 744,053 973,224 1,633,490 1,804,374
Cashiers .. 0 •••••••••• 0 0 •••••••••••••••••' •••• 252,252 510,179 884,531 1,654.151
Miscellaneous clerical workers .................. 253,633 328,399 506.677 I,J63.635
T}"pists .............•..•..•..••....•......•. 60,534 547,923 1,041,804 799;561
Stock clerks and storekeepers .................. 274,089 384,115 482.259 580.979
Receptionists ................................ 77,965 164,446 323,552 536.963
Shippinl and receiving clerks ................... 323,785 325,307 Gl,890 483,183
Bank tellers ................................. 66.944 139,477 265,197 476.233
Estimators and investigators, n.e.co ............. 112.469 171.901 282.074 442,5.53
Counter clerks. except food .................... 96,313 127,630 243,697 398.029
Computer & peripheral equipment operators ..... 868 2.023 124.684 391,909
Keypunch operators ............ 0 ••••••••• 0 ••• 75.091 169,000 290,119 382,118
Clerical supervisors, n.e.c...................... 44,348 56,887 119,887 340.946
Expediters and production controllers ........... 123,277 151,191 217,107 329,621
File clerks ............. 0 ••••• 0 • 0 •••••••••• 0 0 • 118,211 152,160 382.578 316,419
Postal clerks ............... 0 •• 0 •••••••••••••• 216,164 242,872 321.263 315,111
Telephone operators .... 0 •••••••• 0 0 ••••••••••• 363,472 374,495 433,739 314,674
Statistical clerks ...... 0 •••••• 0 ••••••••••• 0 • 0 •• 109,956 143.922 265.431 297,939
Mail carriers, post office ...................... 164,851 203,116 268.612 258,966
Payrol) and timekeeping clerks ........... 0 ••••• 6'.697 112,9OJ 165,815 2J8.387
Teachers' aides, except school monitors .......... 6,105 17.804 139,790 207.391
~1aiI l)andlers. except post office ................ 53,563 67.300 133,839 182..223
Insurance adjusters, examiners. & investigators ... 33.061 58,726 102.043 159.124
Ticket, station, and express agents .............. 69,807 76,994 104.285 152,841
Library attendants and assistants ............... 16,235 38.203 133.911 140,808
Billing clerks ................................. 32.357 45,254 112.876 117,943
Stenographers ......................... 0 ••••• 429,424 283,486 136,197 91,593
Enumerators and interviewers .................. 85,013 118.723 68,697 88,712
Dispatchers and staners, vehicle ................ 33,746 49,205 63,699 87,622
Messengers and office helpers .................. 111,508 61,303 61,050 82,225
Collectors, bill and account .................... 25,395 34,229 54,728 76.982
Meter readers, utility ....... 0 •••••••••••••• 0 ••• 40,696 39,712 35,144 41,407
Real estate appraisers .... 0 •••••••••••••••••••• 11,754 15,822 22,735 41.343
Office machine, n.e.c. ••• 0 •••••••••••••••••••• 9,788 21,352 38,669 39,864
Bookkeeping and billing machine operators ...... 26.610 53,914 67,341 37.200
Weighers.......... 0 ••••••••••••••••••••••••• 80,915 44,548 41,410 29,717
Proofreaders ..... 0 •••••• 0 •• 0 •••••••••••••••• 12,708 17,171 29,940 27.321
Clerical assistants. social welfare................ 0 0 1.279 24.128
Duplicating machine operator .................. 5.520 14.392 21,682 17,971
Calculating machine ................ 0 ••••••••• 19,176 38.903 37,153 17,881
Telegraph operators ............. 0 •••••••••••• 34,811 21,064 13,052 7,604
Tabulating machine operator ..... 0 ••••••••• 0 ••• 9,725 26,937 8.685 3,345
SOURCE: Decennial Census. Data were adjusted for consistency by the authors.
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Table 2.2 ranks these same clerical occupations by the annual compound rate
of change in employment level from 1950 to 1980.[10] Computer and peripheral
equipment operators far exceeded all other clerical occupations in their rate
of increase over this period. This occupation has grown from an employment .
level of 868 persons in 1950 at the dawn of the computer age to nearly 400,000
persons in 1980, an annual rate of growth of over 22 percent. This is the
labor market expression of the computer revolution which began to substantially
affect employment levels in computer-related occupations in the 1960s.
It is interesting to note that the second fastest growing clerical
occupation over the 1950 to 1980 period was teachers' aides; from high-tech to
high-touch in one easy step: The number of teachers' aides increased from
6,000 to over 200,000 in this 30-year period, or about 12 percent per year.
The third fastest growing clerical occupation was typists, even though there
was actually a 23 percent decline in employment from 1970 to 1980. The
phenomenal growth of typists· in the 1950s and 1960s was sufficient to offset
the recent reversals when the entire 30-year period is considered. Following
in order of rate of growth are library attendants, clerical supervisors, bank
tellers, receptionists, and cashiers. Clearly, there is not a high-tech
occupation among them, although they have all been impacted in one way or
another by technological change as well as many other influences.
There were also a few clerical occupations that showed absolute declines
during this 30-year period. The most rapid dec.lines were among stenographers
and telegraph operators, declining in employment by about 5 percent annually.
Both occupations have been impacted by technology, but not in a direct and
obvious way. The telegraph has been all but replaced by superior communication
devices, and this has nearly eliminated the jobs of telegraph operators.
Improvements in dictation equipment and changing habits of users have spurred
the decline in the stenographer occupation. In 1950, there were 2.3
secretaries per stenographer while by 1980 the ratio had risen to 44 to one. .
Fairly rapid declines were also shown by tabulating machine operators and
weighers. Actually, the tabulating machine operators would have been the most
rapidly retreating if 1960 had been taken as the base year. This occupation
provides an excellent example of a technology-specific occupation that
experiences rapid growth and then decline. Tabulating machines were very
popular in the 1950s for analyzing data on punched paper cards. The number of
tabulating machine operators nearly tripled between 1950 and 1960. But data
processing technology moved rapidly beyond the capabilities of tabulating
machines, and the number of employees in this occupation has fallen by nearly
90 percent since 1960. Rounding out the declining occupations are messengers
and office helpers, calculating machine operators, and telephone operators.
All appear to be office technology related declines since the communications
10. The category of clerical assistants, social welfare was omitted since it
was only added in 1970.
Table 2.2
Employment in Clerical Occupations, 1950 to 1980
Ranked by Relative Change 1950 to 1980
Employment AnDuai
percent
Occapatioul title 1950 1960 1970 1980 change
Computer & peripheral equipment operators ...... 868 2,023 124.684 391.909 22.6
Teachers' aides. except scbool monitors ........... 6.105 17,804 139,190 201,391 12.5
T}'Pists .....................••• 0 • 0 •••• 0 •••• 0 • 60•.534 547,923 1.041.804 799,561 9.0
Library attendants and assistants .......... 0 • 0 • 0 • 16,235 38,203 133,911 140,808 '.S
Clerical supervisors, D.e.C. '0, ••••••••••••••••••• 44,348 56,887 119,887 340.946 7.0
Bank tellers .. 0 ••••••••••••••••••••• 0 •• 00 ••••• 66.944 139,477 265,197 476,233 6.8
Receptionists ....................... 0 ••••••••• 77,965 164,446 323,552 536.963 6.6
Cashiers .......... 0 0 ••••••••••••••••••••••••• 252.252 510.179 884,531 1,654,.151 6.5
Office machine operators ............... 0 ••••••• 146,778 326,521 588,356 890.288 6.2
Keypunch operators .................... 0 •••••• 75.091 169.000 290.119 382.118 5.6
Insurance adjusters. examiners. & investigators .... 33.061 58.726 102.043 159,124 5.4
~1iscellaneousclerical workers .................... 253,633 328,399 506,677 1.163.635 5.1
Counter clerks. except food ..................... 96,313 127,630 243,697 398,029 4.8
Office machine" n.e.c. ••••• 00 ••• 00 ••••• 0 ••••••• 9,788 21,352 38.669 39.864 4.8
Secretaries ................ 0 •••••••••••••••••• 1,005,968 1,539.017 2.875,826 4,058.182 4.8
Estimators and investigators, n.e.c•. 0 ••••••••• 0 •• 112,469 171,901 282,074 442,553 4.7
Billing clerks .............. 0 •••••• 0 ••••••••••• 32,357 45,254 112,876 117,943 4.4
Real estate appraisers ....... 0 •••••••••••••••••• 11,754 15,822 22,735 41.343 4.3
Mail handJers. except post office ........ 0 •••••••• 53.563 67,300 133~839 182.223 4.2
Pa~Toll and timekeeping clerks .........•........ 65,697 112,901 165,815 218,387 4.1
Duplicating machine operator ..... 0 ••••••••• 0 ••• 5,520 14,392 21,682 17,911 4.0
Collectors. bill and account ...... 0 0 •••• 0 •••••••• 25,395 34,229 54,728 76,982 3.8
Statistical clerks. 0 •••••••••• 0 •••••••••••••••••• 109,956 143 9 922 265.431 297.939 3.4
File clerks ........ 0 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 118,211 152,160 382,578 316.419 3.3
Expediters and production controllers ............ 123,277 151,191 217,107 329,621 3.3
Dispatchers and starters, vehicle ................. 33,746 49,205 63.699 87,622 3.1
Bookkeepers ................ 0 •••••••••••••••• 744,053 973,224 1,633,490 1,804,374 3.0
Ticket, station, and express agents 0 •••••••••••••• 69,807 76,994 104,285 152,841 2.6
Proofreaders ................. 0 0 •••••••••••••• 12,'08 17,171 29,940 27,321 2.6
Stock clerks and storekeepers ................•.. 274,089 384,115 482,259 580,979 2.5
Not specified clerical workers ................... 1,185,906 1,610,020 862,394 1,886,102 1.5
f\1ail carriers, post office ................... 0 ••• 164,851 203,116 268,612 258,966 1.5
Shipping and receiving clerks .................... 323,785 325,307 Gl,890 483,183 1.3
Postal clerks ...... 0 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 216,164 242,872 321,263 315,111 1.3
Bookkeeping and billing machine operators ....... 26,610 53,914 67,341 37,200 1.1
Enumerators and intervie\\'ers ................... 85,013 118,723 68.697 88,712 0.1
~leter readers, utility ................... 0 ••••••• 40,696 39,712 35,J44 41,407 0.1
Calculating machine ........................... 19,176 38,903 37,153 17,881 -0.2
Telephone operators ..... 0 ••••••••••• 0 ••••••••• 363,472 374,495 433,739 314,674 -0.5
Messengers and office helpers ................... 111,508 61,303 61,050 82,225 -1.0
Weighers ............... 0 ••••••••••••••••••••• 80,915 44,548 41,410 29,717 -3.3
Tabulating machine operator.................... 99725 26,937 8,685 3,345 -3.5
Telegraph operators ........................... 34,811 21,064 13,052 7,604 -4.9
Stenographers ................................ 429,424 283,486 136.197 91,593 -5.0
SOURCE: Decennial Census. Data were adjusted for consistency by the authors.
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and computing capabilities of modern offices have rendered these jobs less
essential than in the past.
With the spectacular exception ·of the computer operator category, the rapid
growth jobs do not show any particular high-technology bent. On the other
hand, the declining occupations do seem to offer a technological
interpretation, at least in part. Whether this represents a general principle
cannot be determined at this time. What is· clear is that the bulk of clerical
employment occurs in a few very large, very diffuse occupational titles, such
as secretary and bookkeeper•. This was less true in 1950 than in 1980. It is
possible that one impact of office technology over the last 30 years has been
to foster more generality in job title and perhaps in duties, but that cannot
be conclusively demonstrated with the data that are currently avai1ab1e.[11]
c. CPS Employment from 1972 to 1982
The long-tenn Census data do not seem to demonstrate a widespread impact of
technology on clerical occupations, but it may be more instructive to examine
recent annual data for detailed occupations from the Current Population
Survey. Due to the benchmarking to Census observations, the only time period
for which this can be done with CPS data is the decade from 1972 to 1982.[12]
If the microprocessor revolution is going to have catastrophic impacts on
clerical employment, it should have become apparent by 1982 when the
microcomputer population reached the one million unit level (Computer and
Business Equipment Manufacturers Association, 1985: 87).
While this period would seem to be adequate for analysis, it is complicated
by the fact that the recession of 1981-82 occurs right at the end of the
period. Although the recession would be certain to distort occupational
employment numbers for production workers in manufacturing industries, its
impact on the employment of clerical workers is less certain.
In addition, the utilization of annual average data from a much smaller
household survey such as the CPS will introduce considerabl~ statistical noise
into the data. When observations are closely spaced, the inevitable sampling
variability becomes all too apparent. Thus, some reservation must be expressed
about any particular annual observation. More confidence can be put in trends
that emerge over a period of three or four years.
Table 2.3 shows the CPS clerical occupations sorted by the annual rate of
change over the 1972-1982 decade. This list is remarkably similar to the
11. See Hunt and Hunt (1986) chapter 2 for a discussion of the difficulties
inherent in measuring employment by occupation.
12. It is frustrating to stop the analysis in 1982. However, the massive
"reorganization of the occupational classification system introduced to the CPS
in 1983 prevents the development of consistent data for all occupations after
1982.
Table 2.3
Employment in Clerical Occupations, 1972 to 1982
Ranked by Relative Change 1972 to 1982
Employment un tboasaDds) Annual
Percent
Occupational ntle 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 change
Computer and peripheral
equipment operators ....... 199 220 251 302 295 311 403 465 535 S64 588 11.4
Bank tellers ................ 290 329 356 356 378 416 458 503 542 569 561 6.8
Insurance adjusters.
examiners and investigators . 109 114 127 153 159 172 173 178 179 19J 200 6.3
Teachers' aides. except
school monitors ........... 208 232 253 292 325 326 348 357 39J 381 373 6.0
Cashiers ................... 998 1.060 1.127 1~ 1,280 1.354 1.434 1,512 1.592 1.660 1,683 5.4
Estimators and
investigators, n.e.c......... 350 334 374 389 423 459 460 506 545 540 570 5.0
Receptionists ............... 439 450 465 468 511 542 600 614 644 675 67~ 4.3
rvlessengers & office helpers ... 79 85 77 78 83 9S 89 95 98 97 115 3.8
Collectors, bill and account ... 61 59 64 73 66 73 80 77 81 93 87 3.6
!\.1ail handlers. except
post office ............... 129 144 148 145 J40 149 164 170 168 175 182 3.5
All other clerical workers ..... 1,329 1,331 1.388 1.375 1,444 1.587 1.705 1.818 1.899 1,956 1,871 3.5
Enumerators & inten'iewers ... 39 49 53 44 49 55 54 61 87 58 53 3.1
Clerical supervisors. n.e.c..... 200 184 231 228 239 229 207 241 245 250 270 3.0
Expediters and production
controllers ............... 196 202 201 214 210 219 228 244 .238 254 257 2.7
Secretaries ................. 2.964 3.088 3.218 3,281 3.428 3.470 3.646 3.792 3.944 3.917 3.847 2.6
Clerical workers ............. 14,329 14,667 15.199 15,321 15.788 16.372 17,207 17.953 18.473 18.564 18,466 2.6
Keypunch operators ......... 284 255 251 253 279 284 277 279 271 248 364 2.5
Dispatchers & staners. vehicle. 86 88 92 93 89 99 99 109 105 115 110 2.5
Bookkeepers ............... 1.592 1,673 1,706 1.709 1,712 1,754 1.861 1,945 1.9"+2 1.961 1,968 2.1
Statistical clerks ............. 301 301 328 331 342 363 384 408 396 3iO 365 1.9
Payroll & timekeeping clerks .. 185 200 206 202 211 231 245 241 237 231 224 L9
Ticket, station, and
express agents ............ 130 118 123 138 126 132 131 148 J44 148 154 1.7
Counter clerks. except food ... 331 352 350 331 359 349 383 369 358 360 373 1.1
Shipping" receiving clerks ... 453 461 469 433 446 474 469 493 515 525 499 1.0
library attendants
and assistants ............. 138 123 135 146 143 J44 174 168 ISS 152 150 0.8
Billing clerks ............ 0 •• 149 166 IS8 14S 140 IS7 170 J64 165 153 154 0.3
File clerks .................. 274 287 279 268 274 280 279 312 332 315 278 0.1
Mail carriers, post office ..... 271 268 268 254 244 244 258 256 247 242 264 -0.3
Stock clerks & storekeepers ... 513 478 493 479 499 50S 516 539 544 528 497 -0.3
Postal clerks ................ 282 303 295 293 291 271 272 264 291 269 271 -0.4
Typists .................... 1,025 1,040 1,046 1.035 995 1.020 1,060 . 1.038 1,043 1,031 942 -0.8
Telephone operators ......... 394 390 393 348 343 347 317 333 323 308 283 -3.3
Bookkeeping and billing
machine operators ......... 69 57 59 60 49 53 47 S9 52 49 42 -4.8
Stenographers .............. 125 107 104 101 101 84 96 78 66 74 66 -6.2
SOURCE: Current Population Survey.
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earlier 1950-1980 rate of change listing in Table 2.2. Once again, computer
and peripheral equipment operators experienced the most rapid rate of increase
of any clerical occupation, although it was only about half the rate shown for
the 1950-80 period. Bank tellers and insurance adjusters, examiners and
investigators both edged ahead of teachers' aides in growth rates during the
more recent decade. This reflects the fall-off in the rate of growth in
teachers' aides as employment growth in education as a whole faltered due to
funding difficulties and a reduction in the student population.
Other clerical occupations showing relatively rapid growth during the 1972
to 1982 decade include cashiers, estimators and investigators, and
receptionists. All three of these occupations involve direct customer contact
and probably would fall into the "hard to automate" ca:tegory. Messengers and
office helpers emerge as a relatively rapidly growing clerical occupation in
the 70's, which is in contrast with their declining employment from 1950 to
1970. The number of bill collectors increased at 3.6 percent annually during
the decade, and non-post office mail handlers increased at 3.5 percent. Once
again, there is no particular pattern that emerges from the listing of clerical
occupations that grew more rapidly than average during this recent decade.
At the other end of the distribution, the decli~ing occupations,
stenographers and telephone operators are joined by bookk~ping and billing
machine operators in rather rapid decline for the 1972 to 1982 period. Small
annual dec1i·nes were registered for typists, postal clerks, mail carriers, and
stock clerks and storekeepers.
Bookkeeping and billing machine operators are another clerical occupation
that may be impacted by the microprocessor revolution. As microcomputers have
become more widely distributed, increasing attention has been paid to creating
accounting software that will run on the micros. This has undoubtedly impacted
the number of bookkeeping machine operators. What is not clear is whether it
has reduced the number of people doing the bookkeeping work. Since they are
not doing it on a special purpose device, it would no longer be appropriate to
call them bookkeeping machine operators, however, and the job titles are very
likely changed.
D. Conclusions
The review of employment trends among clerical workers over the last 30
years does not indicate that changes in office technology have been an
overwhelming influence on those trends. While some occupations show steep
declines in employment levels, it is difficult to argue that in general these
declines are really a consequence of changes in office technology.
Stenographers are one rare example where a change in process technology
(substitution of dictation equipment for human skills) is clearly manifested in
a decline in employment. Tabulating machine operators provide an example of a
clerical occupation where the change in technology has led to a direct
substitution of one occupation (computer operators) for another (tabulating
machine operators).
Among rapidly growing clerical occupations, only the computer and
peripheral equipment operators show a clear relationship to changes in office
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technology. Most other rapidly expanding clerical occupations are distinctly
low-tech. Leading examples include teachers' aides, typists, library
attendants, bank tellers, receptionists, and cashiers. Of course, at such an
aggregated level of analysis, it is difficult to rule out the possibility that
the automation of record keeping functions has served to restrain the growth in
some clerical occupations, thereby making the growth in others appear more
dramatic.
Without more careful stu~ of both inputs and outputs of office production,
definitive conclusions about the impacts of office technology cannot be drawn.
However, the overall impression of this aggregate analysis is that there are
more important determinants of clerical employment trends than changes in
office technology. The next section of the" paper attempts to identify those
determinants.
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III. DETERMINANTS OF CLERICAL EMPLOYMENT
The overall trends in occupational employment indicated that some clericaljobs were growing while others were declining. On an aggregate basis, it was
seen that clerical jobs as a whole were becoming relatively more important as a
proportion of total jobs in the economy, although that growth slowed in the
1970s. It also appeared that the recession of 1980-1982 was unique in that the
proportion of clerical jobs did not increase significantly as it has in past
recessions. It;s not kno~ whether this is a harbinger of the future or an
anomaly caused by the ~rst recession since WWII.
The employment in individual clerical occupations is the focus of this
paper. but it is necessary to look beyond the number of workers in a specific
occupation to determine what might be causing those movements. This section
lOOKS behind the scenes at what might explain the occupational employment
movements discussed earlier.
In the broadest terms possible, employment depends upon output and the
productivity of the workers which produce that output. National output is
generally measured by Gross National Product (GNP), the value of all final
goods and services produced in the econ~ in a year. This simple
relationship, although devoid of occupational and industrial content, helps to
emphasize two major points relevant to this paper.
First. if one accepts the notion that productivity is more or less fixed in
the short run by the technological structure of production. then it should be
clear that changes in GNP -- aggregate demand in the econo~ -- drive any
changes in employment. In turn, many· socio-economic factors may themselves
affect both the level and rate of growth of GNP. There are also totally
unforeseen shocks to the econ~, such as the energy crises of the 1970s, which
at least temporarily disrupt the national economic system. It;s also true
that business cycles, which may vary tremendously in terms of their length and
severity. do periodically recur. The point is ·that all occupations and
industries are adversely affected by the failure of GNP to grow sufficiently.
Likewise. all occupations and industries tend to benefit from reasonable
economic growth.
The second factor which influences employment is productivity. The
concern, of course, is that productivity growth will outpace the growth of
GNP. During recessionary periods it is not unusual for the lack of jobs to be
blamed on labor-saving technology, which is nothing more than automation in
general. However, what must be emphasized here is that productivity growth and
GNP growth are actually intertwined. We all have a vital stake in productivity
gains because that is what allows the possibility of economic growth.
Historically. technological change has not created permanent unemployment
for millions of workers. It instead has raised the living standards of
workers. To be sure, there have been winners and losers in this process. both
among fi~s and individuals. but the net result has been real economic growth.
No one can guarantee that history will repeat itself with office automation
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today but some appear to be too easily persuaded that history will not repeat
itself, i.e., office automation and other labor-saving technologies will wipe
out millions of jobs. Later in this section we assess the past and current
trends in office automation and their impact on clerical workers.
A. Clerical Employment By Industry
The analysis of occupational employment by industry begins with the
occupational profile of the nation. If GNP is considered to be the nation's
output, then this occupational profile represents the relative importance of
each occupation in producing that output. The occupational profile of the U.S.
for 1982 using the major occupational groups from the Current Population Sur~ey(CPS) is presented in Table 3.1.[13] Since occupational structures tend to
change slowly, the snapshot provided here will provide an adequate overview of
the relative importance of the occupations in the nation.
The relative importance of the various industries in the national
employment picture is presented in Table 3.2. By far the most important of the
individual one-digit industries is the service sector. It accounts for a
little over 30 percent of all employment, almost double the size of the-next
biggest sector retail trade. It is also interesting to note that even though·
1982 was a recession year, the durable goods sector holds third place with
about 12 percent of total employment.
But how important are the clerical jobs in each of these industries? That
question is partially answered in Table 3.3 which presents the summary staffing
ratios for all industries. Occupational staffing ratios measure the relative
importance of an occupation in an industry. They are obtained by dividing
occupational employment in an industry by total industry employment. Thus the
staffing ratios of all occupations within an indust~ must sum to one as
reflected in the bottom row of the table. It should be emphasized at the
outset that the broad occupational and industrial groupings at the one-digit
level actually consist of rather heterogeneous subgroupings and therefore
should be interpreted cautiously.
According to Table 3.3, the finance industry shows the highest percentage
of clerical workers, nearly 45 percent of all employees in this industry are
clerical workers. In fact, there are twice as many clerical workers in finance
as any other occupational group employed in that sector. Public administration
is also a heavy employer of clerical workers, about 35 percent of all jobs in
this industry are clerical. It is followed by utilities and wholesale trade
which also utilize heavy proportions (more than 20 percent) of clerical workers
to produce their output. However, in neither of these industries are clerical
workers as dominant as in finance or pUblic administration.
13. The year 1982 is chosen because it is the most recent year in the CPS data
base for which the historical estimates are consistent.
Table 3.1
u.s. OCCUPATIONAL PROFILE
Occupation
1982
Employment
(thousands)
Percent
of Total
Employment
Professional, Technical, and
Related Workers 16,952 17.0
Managers, Officials, and
Proprietors 11,494 11.5
Sales Workers 6,580 6.6
Clerical Workers 18,446 18.5
Craft and Related Workers 12,271 12.3
Operatives 12,807 12.9
Laborers, Except Farm 4,517 4'.5
Service Workers 13,736 13.8
Total, All Occupations 99,528 100.0
Source: Calculations by the authors based upon data from the Current Population
Survey.
Note: Some occupational detail is omitted. Totals and percentages may not add
exactly due to omission of some occupational detail and rounding error.
Industry
Table 3.2.
U.S. INDUSTRY PROFILE
1982
EmploY01E!nt(thousands)
Percent
of Total
Employmen~
Agriculture
Mining
Construction
Durables
Nondurables
Utilities
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
Finance
Services
Public Administration
Total
3,401
1,028
5,756
11,968
8,318
6,552
4,120
16,638
6,270
30,259
5,218
99,528
3.4
1.0
5~8
12.0
8.4
6.6
401
16.7
6.3
30.4
5.2
100.0
Source: Calculations by the authors based upon data from the
Current Population Survey.
Note: Totals and percentages may not add exactly due to
rounding.
Table 3.3
_._------- ---
OCCUPATIONAL STAFFING RATIOS BY INDUSTRY FOR 1982
Non-
Durable Durable Wholesale Retail Public
Occupation Construction Goods Goods Utilities Trade Trade Finance Services Administration
Professional &Technical 0.04 0.15 0.10 0.10 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.31 0.20
Managers &Administrators · 0.13 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.21 0.19 0.20 0.08 0.13
Sales Workers 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.24 0.20 0.22 0.01 .00
Clerical Workers 0.08 0.13 0.13 0.22 0.20 0.17 0.44 0.18 0.35
Craft Workers 0.55 0.21 0.17 0.21 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.06
Operatives 0.04 0.33 0.37 0.02 0.05 0.04 .00 0.03 0.01
Service Workers 0.13 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.03
laborers. Non-Fanm 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.23 0.04 0.26 0.22
TOTAL 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Source: Calculations by the authors based upon data fro. the Current Population Survey.
Note: Some occupational and industrial detail is omitted. Totals and percentages may not add exactly due to omission of some occupational and
TndUstrtal detatl and rounding error.
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The service industry and retail trade both show between 15 and 20 percent
of their total employment in clerical occupations, although their other
occupational needs do not look similar at all. The durable and non-durable
manufacturing industries are the home base of the operatives, but both show
between 10 and 15 percent of their total employment 1n clerical occupations.
last is the construction industry which employs relatively few clerical
workers, but is the dominant user of skilled craft workers· 1n the economy.
Clearly, different industries use ve~ different mixes of occupations to
produce their final output. The occupational staffing ratios are relatively
unique to each type of production. It is this variation in the staffing ratios
between industries that makes trends in industry employment an important
influence on the distribution of occupations throughout the economy_
The absolute number of clerical jobs in each of the major industries is
presented in Table 3.4. About 5.5 million clerical workers can be found in the
service industry. Just under three million clerical jobs are located in each
of two sectors, retail trade and finance. These three sectors combined --
services, retail trade, and finance -- account for over 11 million clericaljobs, almost 60 percent of total clerical employment. Clerical workers may be
dispersed broadly throughout the national econo~, but these three sectors are
especi ally important to total c1eri cal emp'l oyment.
B. Industry Employment Trends
The most detailed data on occupational employment by i'ndustry are currently
collected in the Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) program at BlS. It
provides the historical basis for the staffing ratios in the BlS
industry-occupation matrix which 1s subsequently used as the starting point for
the BLS occupational employment projections. The BLS occupational employment
projections will be discussed later. This section concentrates on gaining a
better understanding of the way in which occupational employment is influenced
by trends in industry employment.
The 20 most important sectoral employers of clerical workers in 1982 are
presented in Table 3.5. The year 1982 is selected because that is the current
base year for the OES occupation by indust~ employment data. The entries in
the table are ranked by the number of clerical employees in each industry. The
clerical staffing ratios and total industry employment are also included to
highlight the importance of these variables indetennining occupational
employment. Finally, the percent of total clerical jobs accounted for by each
of the 20 industries as well as the cumulative ~tal is also reported.
The top 10 industries in terms of clerical ·employment account for about
two-thirds of all clerical employment. The top 20 industries account for over
80 percent of all clerical jobs. While clerical jobs are indeed dispersed
throughout the econo~, none of the top 10 clerical employment industries are
from the gOOds-producing sectors. Furthermore, it is clear how important the
federal and state and local government sectors are to clerical employment.
Jointly they account for over 3.6 million clerical jobs or almost 20 percent of
the, total. We can also see the importance of banking and insurance, the two
I~ble!.~.
OCCJJJATIONAl EttPlOYt1£NT BY INDUSTRY FOR 1982
_..._,----_.
._------
. Publ ic --_._-
Non- Wholesale Reta i1 Admin- .
Occupation Construction Durables Durables Utilities Trade Trade Finance Services i stratton' Total
Professional &Technical 203 1.795 829 679 176 311 418 11.255 1.021 16.952
Managers &Administrators 740 981 694 721 880 3,126 1,232 2.294 668 11.494
Sales Workers 33 177 335 89 1,009 3,310 1.378 230 4 6.580
Clerical Workers 451 1.513 1,074 1.463 844 2,840 2.750 5,473 1.827 18.446
Craft Workers 3.167 2,513 1,393 1.373 349 1,110 129 1.643 292 12,271
Operatives 407 4,275 3,428 1.577 564 1,046 17 999 111 12.807
Service Workers 33 213 186 199 31 3,898 256 7,750 1.145 13,736
laborers. Non-Farm 722 501 379 452 266 997 89 614 148 4,517
TOTAL Ef.tPlOYMENT 5,756 11.968 8,318 6,552 4,120 16,638 6.270 30.259 5.218 99,528
Source: Current Population Survey.
Note: Some occupational and industrial detail ·is omitted. Totals may not add exactly due to omission of some occupational and industrial
detail and rounding error.
. Table 3.5
--_..._-
BLS CLERICAL EMPLOYMENT BY INDUSTRY, 1982
--
Industry Cumulative
Industry Employment Staffing Percent of Percentage of
Industry Employment Clerical Ratio Total Clerical Total Clerical(thousands) (thousands) (percent) Employment "Employment
State' and Local Government and Educational Services 13.068 2,512 19.2 13.4 13.4
Miscellaneous Retail Trade 10,476 2,496 23.8 13.3 26.8
Wholesale Trade 5,294 1.531 28.9 8.2 34.9
Banking 1.650 1,180 71.5 6.3 41.2
Federal Government 2,739 1,138 41.5 6.1 41,,3
Insurance 1.700 911 53.6 4.9 52.2
Miscellaneous Business Services 3,139 896 28.5 4.8 I 57.0Hospitals 4,166 666 16.0 3.6 60.5
•
Social Services, Museums, and Membership Organizations 2,755 3.1 i 63.7587 21.3 i
Credit Agencies. Security and Commodity Brokers 1,015 517 56.9 3.1 66.8
Legal and Miscellaneous Services 1,628 560 34.4 3.0 69.1
Telephone and Other Communication 1.174 529 45.1 2.8 72.6
Physician and Dental Offices 1,309 394 30.1 2.1 74.7
Construction 3,913 324 8.3 1.7 16.4
Eating and Drinking Places 4,181 224 4.7 1.2 71.6
Electric Services and Gas Distribution 792 207 26.2 1.1 78.1
Trucking and Warehousing 1.206 199 16.5 1.1 79.8
Miscellaneous Printing and Publishing 846 192 22.8 1.0 80.8
Real Estate 986 188 19.1 1.0 81.8
Miscellaneous Personal Services 1.219 186 15.3 1.0 82.8
Source: Calculations by the authors based upon data tape fro. the 1982-1995QEStBlS occupational employment projections.
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largest sectors with-in finance in tenns of clerical employment. Finally,
clerical jobs are important in a variety of service sector industries from
business services to personal services.
Since industry employment is so crucial to occupational employment levels,
the trends over the last 27 years in industry employment are presented in
Figure 3.A and Table 3.6. Figure 3.A aggregates the employment in the top 10
industries, while the table presents the employment trends for each of the 10
industries. The numbers are reported in index number fo~ to make it easier to
compare the growth trends. The average growth in ·employment for all industries
is also reported to facilitate comparisons between the particular industry and
the average for all indu~tries. -
Figure 3.A demonstrates a number of important features of the top 10
clerical employment industries. First, these industries have been much less
susceptible to the vagaries of the business cycle than all industries. The
growth rate of the sum of these 10 sectors has remained positive through two of
the three recessions during the period. It was only in 1982, during the worst
recession since WWII, that the composite growth rate of these 10 sectors turned
negative -- and then, barely so.
Second, the average growth rate of these 10 .industries has clearly
outdistanced the all-industry average for the entire 27-year period. But this
is almost entirely due to the fact that employment in these sectors does not
ordinarily retreat during recessionary periods, but j.ust keeps expanding. The
conclusion appears to be that employment in these 10 important clerical
employment industries has grown faster ·than employment in the overall. economy,
but that most of this positive growth differential occurs during recessions.
By looking at the employment trends in each of-the 10 industries, some of
the diversity among the sectors begins to emerge. The·most robust growth has
clearly occurred in banking, miscellaneous business services, hospitals, and
the credit agency, security and commodity broker sector. The growth in
employment in mi scellaneous business services is 'particul arly .striking, more
than six times as many workers in this sector in 1984 than there were in 1958.
This compares to about a 67 percent growth rate for all employment. This
sector provides a ~riad of services to business fi~s from accounting to
customized computer software to consulting advice.
The growth rate of employment in hospitals is also striking. This sector
tripled in employment over the period 1958 to 1984. Some of the causes of this
growth, such as the aging of the pop~lation and the increasing availability of
medical insurance for retirees and the indige~t through government programs,
are well known. In any event, the growth of this sector has not been touched
by the business cycle and may have even accelerated during the last
recessionary period. The real surprise is that hospftal employment growth
slowed in 1983 and actually turned negative in 1984. Apparently the recent
emphasis on cost containment and the shortening of hospital stays is having an
impact on employment in that sector. .
Figure 3.A
TOP 10 INDUSTRIES
BLS I/O ~'-IISTORICAL, 1958-1984
1970 1975 1980
x All 105 Industries
Table 3.6
-------
TOTAL ItJOUSTRY Et1PLOYMEUT GROWTH OF THOSE SECTORS WITH THE MOST CLERICAL EMPLOYE_~~
Credit Social
State & Misc. Misc. Agencies & Services
Local Reta i1 Wholesale Federal Business Connodity And Top 10 All 105
Year Government Trade Trade Banking Government Insurance Services Hospitals Brokers Museums Industries Industries
1958 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 ItO 100 100
1959 104 103 103 104 102 101 110 106 109 118 104 104
1960 108 ·98 105 109 104 103 116 113 116 122 108 105
1961 112 105 105 112 104 105 123 120 124 128 109 105
1962 116 107 107 116 107 106 135 126 129 131 113 107
1963 122 109 109 120 108 109 146 134 132 133 116 108
1964 128 112 112 124 107 III 159 143 138 134 120 111
1965 136 116 116 128 109 112 173 149 142 136 126 114
1966 146 121 121 134 117 114 192 156 149 140 132 119
1967 154 124 124 141 124 119 211 171 156 146 138 122
1968 161 128 127 148 125 122 224 182 171 153 144 125
1969 167 133 131 159 126 125 248 195 186 157 150 129
1970 174 136 134 169 125 129 262 205 182 159 154 129
1971 180 139 134 174 123 131 264 213 184 163 158 130
1972 189 144 138 181 123 133 282 218 194 157 163 134
1973 196 149 144 191 122 135 308 226 202 158 169 139
1974 203 149 149 202 124 139 326 238 202 162 174 141
1975 211 148 148 206 125 140 333 250 202 165 178 139
1976 215 153 153 212 . 125 142 359 260 210 170 183 142
1977 220 158 158 220 124 148 386 271 222 172 190 148
1978 229 165 167 231 126 154 429 280 238 177 199 155
1979 233 168 175 243 127 160 472 287 256 183 206 159
1980 237 167 177 255 131 164 504 303 268 189 210 160
1981 235 168 180 264 121 167 540 320 284 190 212 161
1982 232 166 177 268 125 168 551 332 291 190 212 159
1983 232 169 176 270 126 169 580 334 317 190 215 160
1984 233 171 185 213 121 172 654 329 343 196 222 167
Source: Calculations by the authors based upon data from the BLS input-output industry series.
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It is also clear that the finance sector -- especially banking, credit
agencie~, security and commodity brokers, and to a lesser extent, insurance --
contributed significantly to clerical job growth during these years.. All three
of these sectors have staffing ratios for clerical workers in excess of 50
percent, the highest of all industries. Insurance deserves special mention in
that its employment growth virtually paralleled that of all industries until
about 1974. Then it began to accelerate and outdistanced the national economy
in job growth thereafter, except for 1984. The growth of 8IIIPloymerit in
banking, on the other hand, was consistently higher than that for insurance,
nearly tripling from 1958 to 1984.
The slowest growth among the 10 industries with heavy clerical employment
occurred in the federal government. The employment trend was very flat from
1965 through 1984e The federal government has not been a source of significant
employment growth in the last 20 years. It should also be noted that the
growth of state and local government while generally above average, actually
declined absolutely during the 1980-1982 recession. By the end of 1984,
employment in this sector had still not exceeded its peak employment level
achieved in 1980. This is significant because it is the first such decline and
sluggish recovery in recent history for the largest single employer of clerical
workers among the 105 industries in this analysis.
Of course, the gnawing question is: will these industries show rapid
employment growth in the future? That question cannot be answered at this
point. However, it should be noted that the nation is still experiencing a
long run shift from a goods-producing economy to a service-producing economy.
This is not to say that the goods-producing sectors such as manufacturing are
unimportant, but only that they have not been growing in te~s of employment
for a long time.
Historically, clerical workers have benefited from this shift since service
industries employ much higher proportions of clerical workers. Thus, even if
staffing ratios begin to fall for clerical workers (due to office automation or
other factors), it is still possible for them to grow at or above the average
rate for all jobs because they are concentrated in the nongoods-producing
sectors. Clerical workers have a fortunate industry mix in their employment
pattern. The next section explores the technological influences on clericaljobs, while the last section measures the contribution of both changing
staffing ratios and changing industry mix to the growth of clerical jobs over
the last decade.
C. Technological Change and Clerical Employment Growth
One of "the goals of office automation is to improve labor productivity.
Consequently, actual gains in labor productivity may be the best measure of the
degree to which this goal is realized. This approach looks at the results of
the implementation of office automation rather than attempting to assess the
technological capability or potential of the equipment. It also avoids an
assessment of the management plans of finms. Obviously, firms seldom achieve
the technological potential that is inherent in capital equipment, but it is
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also not unusual for the management plans of firms to be at wide variance with
actual operating results.
The major problems in attempting to estimate.the true gains from office
automation are twofold. First, it is impossible to glean from current data any
information whatsoever about the relative importance of office automation
spending by firm or industry.[14] Investment data are subdivided only into the
two broad subcomponents of machine~ and equipment and structures~ Second,
complete data about clerical jobs are not avaflable over tfme fn any event.
So, even if better investment data were available, ft would still be impossible
to estimate the productivity gains specifically attributable to clerical
workers utilizing various types of electronic ~ffice technology.
One simple approach to examining the productivity gains from office
automation is to study those sectors which are significant employers of
clerical workers and which are also believed to be the leaders in office
automation. It is well known that the broad industrial sector of finance and
insurance is the forerunner and recognized leader in the field of office
automation. It is also true that more than one-half of the workers in this
sector are clerical workers. Therefore, one indicative approach to studying
the productivity gains from office automation is to examine the overall
productivity gains in finance and insurance. Of the 105 detailed industries
analyzed in this paper, finance and insurance is composed of three sectors,
banking, insurance, and credit agencies, security and commodity brokers. These
three sectors have clerical staffing ratios of 71.5 percent, 53.6 percent, and
56.9 percent respectively. Thus, if office automation improves productivity,
these sectors are logical candidates to demonstrate the effects of such gains.
Figure 3.8 reports the productivity gains for banking, insurance, and
credit agencies, security and commodity brokers for the period, 1958-1983.[15]
The ~ata are reported in index number form to better depict the percent changes
in productivity from year to year. The data for all private nonfarm employment
are reported as well to facilitate a comparison of these sectors with the
aggregate of all private employers, excluding agriculture.
The surprise from Figure 3.8 is that there is no discernible trend that can
even remotely be attributed to office automation. The productivity gains in
banking, insurance, and credit agencies, security and commodity brokers, have
14. See Hunt and Hunt (1985) for an examination of the data bases which are
available to study the employment effects of technological change.
15. The gross output in constant dollar terms and employment measures are those
defined by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in Bulletin 2018. Time Series Data
for Input-Output Industries: Output, Price and Employment (March 1979). The
actual data utilized in this paper are from an unpublished update (April, 1985)
to the tables in the aforementioned document.
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all tended historically to lag the average for private nonfann employment. In
fact, productivity for credit agencies, security and cOlllllodity brokers was very
slightly lower in 1983 than i.n 1958, and productivity deteriorated absolutely
in insurance after 1977. Since 1981, banking productivity has improved
relative to all private nonfarm productivity, but it hardly looks like a
revolution, especially given that banking productivity declined from 1979 to
1981.
It should be emphasized once again that these are not measures of the
productivity gains for clerical workers nor can these gains be attributed to
office automation. They are industry-wide measures for output gains due to all
employment. However, these industries are predominantly made up of clerical---
workers and it is popularly believed that these sectors are the leaders in
office automation. All that can be fairly concluded is that there is nothing
in the aggregate industry data to support the notion that office automation has
engendered significant overall productivity gains in these three sectors.
Perhaps these sectors have not been investing in office automation in the
way it is popularly believed. Although the investment data do not report
office automation expenditures separately, an examination of these data might
reveal if there are any new trends in investment in these sectors. Figure 3.C
reports in index number form real investment spending per employee by finance
and insurance firms, the lowest level of industrial detail for such investment
data.[16] Once again, the totals for private nonfa~ employment are also shown
to provide a reference point for the analysis.
In contrast to the lack of any "take-off" evident in the productivity data
for finance and insurance, the investment data in Figure 3.C clearly indicates
much higher than average investment tre~ds in finance and insurance after
1966-67. In fact, investment virtually exploded. even after accounting for the
significant employment gains in finance and insurance over that time period.
Investment per employee in finance and insurance grew a little more than five
times the average for all private nonfarm employment after 1966-67.[17]
There is no doubt that finance and insurance is investing heavily in new
capital equipment. However, it is less certain that finance and insurance is
really investing in office automation. Again, the truth is that we do not know
how much of investment in this sector can be truly identified as "office
automation spending." What can be concluded is that the dramatic growth in
16. The investment data are from the national income and product accounts. See
Seskin and Sullivan 1985.
17. The trend in investment per employee is important because it indicates
whether something new appears to be happening in that sector, but it is by no
means the full story. Historically, absolute investment per employee in
finance and insurance has tended to be much less than the average for all
nonfarm private industries. That situation reversed itself in the 1970s.
Figure 3.C
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investment in finance and insurance has not resulted in measurable labor
productivity gains to date.
One explanation of this puzzling situation is that the aggregate indust~
data are flawed. Gross output (or perhaps hours worked) may be measured
inaccurately. It may also be that the industry aggregation masks the true
changes which are occurring within the individual sectors, or at the firm
level. Hunt and Hunt (1985) discussed the many general data problems in
exploring the employment impacts of technological change in another paper.
Suffice it to say that the investment growth 1n finance and insurance is so
pronounced over such a long period of time, that it is difficult to believe
that the productivity data are so flawed that they would not register at least
the beginning of a new trend, if one were actually occurring.[18]
Formal case studies of the economic impacts of office automation are
generally lacking, but there is fragmentary information which at least casts
some doubt on the most wildly optimistic productivity claims of advocates of
office automation. First, a number of recent books (Bailey, et. al., 1985;
Diebold, 1985; and Katzan, 1982) have been published which are designed to be
guides for managers interested in improving productivity through office
automation. The surprise is that these books contain so few references to the
actual experiences of firms or to the productivity gains which managers can
reasonably hope to achieve with office automation. For instance, Katzan
includes an entire chapter on word processing, but provides no hint about the
likely potential productivity gains. For whatever the reasons, these guides to
office automation written for managers are almost totally devoid of
specifications of the productivity gains from office automation.
Second, Paul Strassman, .an executive and office automation specialist. with
Xerox, has recently assessed (1985) the technology which he has been associated
with for over twenty years. Although Strassman is optimistic about the
potential productivity gains from computers and info~ation technology
generally, he eschews the current focus on hardware, saying that it is less
relevant than the people using that hardware. In fact, he suggests (1985:
151-152) that the growth rates of the early 1980s and the euphoria about this
technology are unsustainable unless it produces demonstrable investment
returns. Strassman does not find much evidence of such returns currently:
The preliminary findings of ~ research raises doubts about
the assumptions which managements in the businesses I have
sampled so far must have made when they increased their
computer-technology budgets in pursuit of improved productivity.(1985: 159) ·
18. There are serious concerns about the quality of the aggregate data. But
BLS has constructed special productivity indexes in banking measuring output as
services rendered and labor input as actual hours worked. The overall result,·
1967-1980, is that productivity growth in banking remains very slightly below
the national average for all nonfarm businesses. See Brand and Duke (1982).
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Strassman thinks the payoff will come when management focuses on strategic
goals and the people who will accomplish those goals rather than on the methods
to achieve those goals.
Third, it is very interesting to note that International Data Corporation(IDC), which may be the information indust~'s largest market research and
consulting firm, has repeatedly stressed that the labor productivity gains from
office automation fall far short of justifying the purchase of the equipment.
According to IDe (1984, 1983, 1982), the direct labor savings attributable to
an office automation project over a five-year period usually amount to no more
than one-half the cost of implementation of the system. IDC states that this
rule of thumb does not include the training costs of implementing office
automation. However, it also does not include any improvements in the quality
of the output of offices. IDC concludes that it is the quality improvements
which justify the adoption of office automation.
Perhaps the most eloquent statement of the thesis that the adoption of
information technology, which includes office automation, does not lead to
dramatic productivity gains has been written by John Leslie King and Kenneth L.
Kraemer (1981), who are researchers at the University of Southern California
and the University of Arizona respectively. They contend that, while the cost
of hardware is falling, the total cost of electronic computing is rising
rapidly (1981:101). Furthermore, many of the non-hardware costs tend to be
hidden from normal accounting procedures used to justify implementation. So
these costs do not necessarily affect the implementation decision itself,
although they would adversely impact the firm's actual operating results.
King and Kraemer (1981:102) find that "••• software procurement, software
maintenance, and data management and computing management, are-all becoming
increasinglyexpensive.- New positions and even departments are springing up
in firms to evaluate software, perform system maintenance, coordinate among
different users etc. It is not unusual for finns to find that "off-the-shelf"
software is unsatisfactory for their computing needs, necessitating significant
investment in software programming. As electronic computing becomes more
widespread in finms through the adoption of personal computers, King and
Kraemer (1981:101) think that it will become increasingly difficult for
management to track these costs. Users at all levels dedicate some portion of
their time to routine maintenance tasks. Worse, some may even develop a
personal interest in the technology which diverts them from other work.
According to King and Kraemer (1981:101) management seldom knows the
ongoing costs of training, normal system maintenance, or unplanned downtime
that are in fact incurred because of the firm's utilization of information
technologies. They -cite (1981:103) a variety of other studies and fragmentary
data which appear to indicate that the annual costs for system maintenance run
at least 20 percent of the cost of the development of the system itself and may
even be much higher. They think the costs due to breakdowns may be
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particularly significant in highly integrated systems. According to King and
Kraemer (1981:107):
•••when systems become integrated and units become more
interdependent in a real-time sense, problems in one
system or unit can literally stop progress in others
simply by disruption of the srocess of interaction. As
integration increases, inter ependency increases. Together,
these two phenomena result in increased costs.
It is just these kinds of changes in manufacturing process technology that lead
to the extreme reliability requirements that can impede technological change.
King and Kraemer's arguments should not be dismissed lightly.
Finally, it should be mentioned that even some computer vendors are not
emphasizing cost savings per se in their attempts to sell office automation.
Wang Laboratories makes available to potential customers a booklet about cost
justification (1985). It stresses the complexity of the cost justification
process for office automation. One of the premises of the booklet (1985: 3) is
that information technology systems are fundamentally • ••• different from other
kinds of capital equipment inve~tments and should be treated differently with
regard to cost justification.· The booklet includes six examples of firms
which have successfully cost-justified" their systems. The emphasis in all
cases is on improvements in quality rather than direct cost savings.
Although there appear to be no documented case studies of the economic
impacts of office automation,[19] there is scattered evidence that at least
casts some doubt on the most optimistic expectations for office automation. In
general, these sources indicate that the costs of installation and continued
operation of office automation systems are higher than most people think. If
true, these additional costs would obviously translate into reduced
productivity gain from office automation. But there are still other reasons
why office automation may not have a significant impact on productivity.
First, one of the most obvious reasons that office automation may not have
created measurable productivity gai~s industry wide is that the diffusion of
the technology may not have proceeded nearly as far as implied by the popular
media. According to a national random survey by Honeywell, Inc. (1983), of
1,264 general office secretaries employed in information-intensive
establishments with 100 or more employees, office automation equipment is not
yet in widespread use in most offices. Fewer" than one-half of the secretaries
19. Salerno (1985) and Strassman (1985) have reached similar conclusions.
There is, however, considerable literature about the sociological impacts of
office automation. For a review and introduction to this literature, see
Attewel1 and Rule (1984). From the economists' perspective, these studies are
lacking in a systematic treatment of output, capital input, prices of outputs
and inputs, and other economic variables.
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reported having access to an electronic memory typewriter/word processor/
personal computer in the general office area in which they work, less than
one-fourth possessed- any of this equipment at their individual workstation
(1983: 111-5). Given these results, it should not be surprising that almost
none of the secretaries reported having direct access to electronic majl,
computerized scheduling or computerized filing, while about 15 percent said
that such equipment was located somewhere in the office area (1983: 111-5).
These results are surprising in part because the sampling frame included
only establishments with 100 or more employees, i.e., predominantly larger
establishments, in information-intensive industries,[20] exactly where one
would expect to find office automation in place. It should also be mentioned
that there was a significa~t positive correlation in the survey between
establishment size and the likelihood of having office automation equipment.
Thus, this report lends some credence to the undocumented claims reported in
the popular media that only one in ten small fi~s are using personal computers
currently.
The second reason that office automation m~ not be having an impact on
productivity ;s that office automation may not be synonomous with electronic
office technology. The reasons for this conclusion are twofold. First, office
automation may simply represent additional capital support for office workers
rather than capital-substitution for labor. In part, this is a restatement of
the quality argument presented earlier. It may also be what fi~s are
referring to when they talk about office automation insuring their competitive
survival by providing real time data and feedback. Thus, aside from the
question of whether electronic office technology saves labor time directly,
there ;s no doubt that it permits more adequate analytical support for
decision-making, timely answers to customer inquiries, more rapid tracking of
firm sales data allowing better invento~ control,. and many other gains in
quality.
The second part of the issue is more basic and fundamental. It appears
that the adoption of office automation may actually transfo~ the product being
produced rather than simply the process which is used to produce that product.
Innovative products and services are being designed because electronic office
technology is available to deliver those services. This new production and
delivery of services creates jobs.
The third reason that office automation may not produce the anticipated
productivity gains is closely related to the process of deepening the capital
base which supports office workers. Anyone who is acquainted with word
processors knows that it is irresistible to make that one last revision when
the marginal cost is so low. Those who have utilized electronic spreadsheet
software know that it results in a whole new world of opportunities for tabular
and graphical analyses. The problem is that the output of most offices cannot
20. The report does not specify the definition of information-intensive
industries.
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be measured simply and unequivocally so it is extremely difficult to know how
much the new technologies have added to the bottom line of the firm.
The expansion of existing work due to the friendliness of the technology in
accomplishing that work cannot be dismissed as simply the failure of management
to properly control the technology. What manager is satisfied with the
information which he or she has available for decision-making? The
installation of personal computers taps hidden computing needs that executives
always wanted to do. but there was not the manpower or the time available to do
it on the firm's mainframe computer. The diffusion of the newer and smaller
microelectronics based computer systems beyond the formally designated computer
centers eliminates this roadblock. Suffice it to say that we think that even
the best managers and the best managed offices take advantage of the lower
marginal cost of computing by utilizing- it in new and different ways. This
result is compounded by our inability to adequately measure the output from an
office in the first place.
The fourth reason that office automation may not be producing the promised
productivity gains is that there may indeed be technical constraints inherent
in the current technology which reduces its effectiveness. Word processors may
not really be that much different than their earlier nonelectronic
predecessors. Both are appendages used to accomplish standard office
functions. Until more advanced devices and appropriate methods are in routine
operation. the changes may be limited.
There also appear to be severe hardware and software compatibility problems
across computer systems. Complaints from firms abound concerning the current
limitations of electronic mail, for example. It is undoubtedly true that many
firms discover the hard way that it doesn't work in the real world quite the
way it did in the sales demonstration. This is a characteristic of new
technology. It is not totally predictable until it is old established
technology.
The conclusion appears to be that even when direct communications systems
are installed, say in the form of a local area network, it will likely still be
a relatively primitive system. It may not be possible to use the LAN to access
the large data bases on the firm's mainframe computer. It may not be possible
to transmit a graph via the network. While it may be possible to access a user
who is not on the local area network, the procedure may be too tedious and
cumbersome to be truly useful in the transmission of serious business
messages. In short, the allowable traffic on the local area network may be
very structured and severely limited by the available hardware and software.
The office with instantaneous access to any data base around the world and
total communications flexibility still lies somewhere in the future.
Many writers have compared this stage 1n the evolution of computers to that
of autos in the 1920s. The technology for autos had already been fi~ly
established by that date. What was needed, however. were the highways which
would make it possible to effectively utilize the technology. According to
this analogy, computers now need ·pathways· to effectively communicate across
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dissimilar hardware and software systems before it is possible to realize their
full potential.
Finally, we cannot ignore the fact that the entire computer industry is
currently experiencing unexpectedly slow growth in sales. Finns such as Wang,
which have specialized in the office automation market. have actually
furloughed workers for the first time in corporate histo~. What is surprising
about this slowdown is that it is occurring during a relatively robust recovery
from the 1980-82 recession. It is happening exactly when most computer
industry officials had expected an explosion in computer and office automation
sales. Apparently the office automation revolution 1s being delayed somewhat
by the unwillingness of individuals and firms to enthusiastically embrace the
technology. That is not meant to deny the healthy growth that occurred in'
earlier years. What it does imply, however, is that for whatever the reason it
does not appear that the marketplace is currently supporting the most
optimistic claims of the proponents of office automation. It remains to be
seen, of course, how long the current slowdown will last.
In summary, this review of the technological influences on clerical
employment has been relatively unsatisfying. There are no general time series
data about office automation spending by industry or about the application of
devices by individual occupations. The analysis of overall productivity gains
in finance and insurance did not provide any evidence that office automation is
producing significant productivity gains in that sector despite the fact that
real investment spending in finance and insurance has skyrocketed since the
1ate 1960s.
There appear to be many possible explanations for the apparent lack of
productivity gains from office automation to date. The data m~ be flawed.
The diffusion of office automation may not have proceeded as far as many have
thought. The equipment may be technically limited, more expensive and less
productive than many think. It is also possible that much of what we term
office automation is not being purchased as labor-saving process technology at
all. There may simply be a deepening of capital occurring as products and
services become more information-intensive.
D. Decomposition of Occupational Employment Changes
In earlier sections the focus was on the overall trends in occupational
employment, whereas in this section it has been on those factors which might
explain occupational employment, namely (1) general economic conditions, (2)
the sectoral composition of the econ~, and (3) the relative importance of the
occupations within those sectors. ·What is needed 1s an analytical device to
summarize the effects of these influences on occupational employment.
Otherwise, it is all too easy to beconae lost in a IIOrass of details.
The analytical tool which will be used to summarize the detailed
occupation-industry data is presented in this section of the paper. It is an
artificial separation, or decomposition, of occupational employment changes
into the components due to overall economic growth, differences in the rates of
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growth of industries, and changes in the staffing ratios within
industries.[21J This tool is then applied to the occupational employment
changes which have occurred from 1972 to 1982, using the one-digit i~dustries
and occupations from the CPS data.
The trend in occupational employment can be thought of as arising from
three factors. First, the overall health of the econo~, as indicated by total
employment, exerts a strong influence on occupational employment. ·Without
sufficient aggregate demand, employment in most occupations: will surely fall.
The second influence on occupational employment is the relative importance of
the different industries in the total econo~. Earlier it was demonstrated
that there are very wide differences ,in the proportions of clerical employment
in different industries. For example~ clerical workers are particularly
concentrated in finance and public administration. So clerical jobs will grow
faster than the average for all jobs if these industries grow faster than the
average for all industries (even without any changes in staffing ratios).
Finally, the third influence on occupational employment trends is the set of
staffing ratios that characterize the different industries.
If the net effect of office automation 1s the displacement of clericaljobs, over time clerical staffing ratios will fall. Thus, the decomposition
methodology provides an opportunity to assess the technological influence of
office automation on clerical jobs. This attempt is sorely needed since the
analysis in the previous section proved to be so inconclusive about the
productivity gains from office automation.
In general, changing staffing ratios are probably the most visible
manifestation of the SfeCifiC effects of technologi~al change on occupational
employment. For examp e, the staffing ratios for computer-related occupations
have risen in many industries over time due to the dramatic increases in the
use of computers. On the other hand, the staffing ratios for stenographers
have been falling over a long period of· time due to the adoption of dictation
equipment, a technological change which reduces the need for stenographers.
However, it should be emphasized that staffing ratios may change for other
reasons, such as organizational change, job title change with no change in job
content, or others. In particular it should be understood that any time an
individual occupational staffing ratio changes, all of the remaining staffing
ratios in that industry will change as well. This occurs because the sum of
the staffing ratios in an industry must equal one (recall that staffing ratios
are obtained by dividing each occupation's employment 1n that industry by total
employment in the industry). Thus, if a particular industry was very
successful in automating production worker jobs, 'perhaps by using robots, then
the relative importance of other jobs such as clericals, professionals, etc.
21. A more technical description of the decompositi"on is provided in Hunt and
Hunt (1986), chapter 4.
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will increase. This demonstrates that changes in staffing ratios should not be
considered in isolatio~; other changes may be taking place as well.
The mathematical decomposition of occupational employment growth is not an
explanation of cause and effect; many complex economic and noneconomic forces
lie hidden behind the numbers. It is really the simultaneous interaction of
all three factors which dete~i-ne employment -trends in any p~rticular
occupation. -
The three~way decomposi.tion of occupational employment growth into changes
due to (1) constant employment shares (economic growth), (2) differential rates
of industry growth, and (3) staffing ratios changes is applied to historical
data for 1972 to 1982 from· the Current Population Survey (CPS). It should be
mentioned that the other obvious candidate for' such a decomposition, the Census
of Population data, cannot be used. As discussed earlier, it is a major task
to redefine census occupations so that they are consistent over time. It is
impossible to do it for occupations within industries without a special dual
classification study.
One~d1git industries and occupations are used 1n the analysis because the
CPS sample is far too small to provide both industrial and occupational detail
below that level. Thus, this aggregate analysis may mask the changes which are
occurring at more disaggregated levels. The time period for the analysis,
1972-1982, is selected because that is the only recent time span for which
consistent data are available. However, 1982 was a recession year so ther~ may
be some distortions in the data. Nonetheless, having duly noted the
qualifications and cautions, the highly aggregative one~digit CPS data will at
least provide an important overall perspective on trends in U.S. occupational
employment growth.
The results of the decomposition for the major occupational groupings are
presented 1n Table 3.7 and summari'zed in Figure 3.0. From 1972 to 1982 the
number of clerical jobs increased by just over 4 million for a 28.8 percent
'gain over 1972 employment levels. During that same time span total employment
increased by 21.1 percent. So clerical jobs grew faster than the average for
all jobs, which also means that clerical jobs were becoming relatively more
important in the national econo~.
Turning to the occupational decomposition, it is possible to examine the
factors which contributed to that clerical job growth. The bulk of all new
clerical jobs, a little over three million, were added as a consequence of the
overall growth of the econ~J identified as constant- employment shares in the
table. Another 625,000 clerical jobs were added because clerical workers were
more prevalent in industries that were growing faster than the average for all
industries. This factor 1s labeled differential rates of industry growth in
the table. Finally, 466,000 clerical jobs were added due to increasing
staffing ratios for clerical jobs; that amounts to 3.3 percent of the 1972
employment level for clerical workers. This does not mean that staffing ratios
in all industries were increasing for .clerical occupations, but rather that the
net effect across all industries was positive.·
TabJ!!_l-:l
u. S. OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT G~~J!i_~. 19J_?.:_t982
-- - -
Decomposition of Emplo~ent Changes, 1972-1982
Employment Changes f--.---- -_.-Absolute Changes Percent of 1972 Occupational Employment
-
DifferentialOccupation Change in Change in Constant Rates of Differential
1972 1982 Employment EMployment Employment Industry Staffing Constant Rates of
Employment Employment 1912-1982 1972-1982 Shares Growth Ratios Ellploytllent Industry Staffing
(thousands) (thousands) ( thousands) (percent) (thousands) (thousands) ( thousands) Shares Growth Ratios
Professional, technical 11,536 16,952 5.416 46.9 2.439 922 2,055 21.1 8.0 17.8
~nagers, administrators 8,082 11,494 3,412 42.2 1.109 246 1.451 21.1 3.0 18.0
Sales workers 5,383 6,580 1.197 22.2 1.138 281 -222 21.1 5.2 -4.1
Clerical workers 14,326 , 18,446 4.120 28.8 3,029 625 466 21.1 4.4 3.3,
i
Craft and kindred workers 10,867 i 12,271 1.404 12.9 2,298 -190 -104 21.1 -7.3 -1.0I
Operatives 13,612 12,801 -805 -5.9 2.878 -1,457 -2,226 21.1 -10.7 -16.4
Laborers, nonfanm 4,241 4,511 276. 6.5 897 -203 -418 21.1 -4.8 -9.9
Service 11,024 13,736 2.112 24.6 2,331 1,102 -721 21.1 10.0 -6.5
Total 82,155 99.528 17,373 21. 1
Source: Calculations by the authors bdsed upon data from the Current Population Survey.
Note: Some occupational detail is ~nitted. Totals and percentages may not add exactly due to omission of some occupational detail and rounding error.
Thedecomposition was accomplished using I-digit SIC code industries.
Figure 3.0
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Table 3.7 demonstrates very rapid growth in the professional and technical
group and in the management and administrative field, more than double the
average growth for all jobs. It is also very interesting to note that a
significant proportion of the growth in these fields can be attributed to
increasing staffing ratios for those jobs. In contrast, the impacts of
changing staffing ratios for such occupations as craft and kindred workers,
operatives, and laborers were all negative, undoubtedly influenced in part by
the recession.
It cannot be ruled out that the reported increase in staffing ratios for
clerical jobs was influenced to some degree by the declining staffing ratios
for jobs that are traditionally more susceptible to layoffs during recessions.
What can be said is that neither changing staffing ratios nor differential
rates of industry growth were major contributors to clerical employment growth
in the 10 years from 1972 to 1982, although both factors were modestly positive
during the period. The more intensive utilization of clericals improved total
clerical employment levels by 3.3 percent and the differential rates of
industry growth added 4.4 percent to clerical employment totals.
Since total employment growth for each occupation is merely the sum of the
effects across all industries, it is also possible to look at the details of
the decomposition for a particular occupation in each industry. The results of
the decomposition of the growth in clerical jobs for each of the one-digit
industries is presented in Table 3.8 and Figure 3.E.
What is particularly striking in this second s~t of figures is that
staffing ratios for clerical jobs are falling in a number of sectors. Most
interesting are the results for the finance sector, probably the biggest user
of office automation to date. The finance sector has been a rapidly growing
sector as indicated by the 37 percent overall growth rate of clerical jobs in
that sector versus the 28.8 percent growth rate for all clerical jobs. Thus,
the effects of falling staffing ratios, which would have reduced jobs in this
sector by 6.9 percent from 1972 employment levels, were more than made up by
the fast growth of the industry itself. However, if the industry had not
expanded so rapidly, there would have been actual reductions in employment of
clerical workers in the finance sector.
Staffing ratios for clerical jobs have also been falling in three other
important industries -- utilities, wholesale trade, and public administration.
The decline in public administration ;s difficult to explain. No one maintains
that government has been in the forefront in adopting office automation. On
the other hand, the postal service has automated many clerical jobs in the mail
sorting operation. It is also true that government was one of the slowest
growing sectors during this time period. So it is possible that government
administrators, when faced with tight budgets and rising demands for services,
economized more on clerical jobs than other positions. It is not possible to
provide an adequate explanation of the fall 1n staffing ratios for public
administration or the other industries. Clearly, more study of these trends is
called for.
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Decomposition of Clerical Employment Changes, 1972-1982
lmployment Changes _ -__ .___w_ --- _.-- _ ... - _._. _._---_.- ---_.- - .. _~_.
Absolute Changes Percent of 1972 ElIPloyment
1---. - ..---.- -~._._---_.__ ..- _._------._----1----- . -_ ... --_.- --..... ._--_ .._._-
--
Indus try 0, fferentia 1
Change in Change in Cons tant Rates of Differential
1972 1982 [nIp1oymen t Employment Employment Industry Staffing Constant Rates of
[Inp1oymen t Employment 1972-1982 1972-1982 Shares Growth Ratios Employment Industry Staffing(thousands) (thousands) (thousands) (percent) ( thousands) ( thousands) ( thousands) Shares Growth Ratios
_._._- -- ---_. - --_ ......- l-----
---1---.---- .-
Agriculture 48 83 35 72.9 10 -11 36 21. 1 -22.9 75.0
Mining 59 128 69 11609 12 29 28 21. 1 49.1 47.5
Construction 362 451 89 24.6 77 -44 56 21. 1 -12.1 15.5
Ourables 1,352 1,513 161 11.9 286 -244 119 21.1 -18.0 8.8
Nondurables 1,040 1,074 34 3.3 220 -222 36 21. 1 -21.3 3.5
Ut i 1i ties 1.301 1,463 156 11.9 276 -23 -97 21. I -1.8 -7.4
Wholesale Trade 684 844 160 23.4 145 86 -11 21.1 12.6 -10.4
Retai 1 Trade 2,099 2,840 741 35.3 444 45 252 21.1 2.1 12.0
Finance 2,007 2,7'50 743 37.0 424 457 -138 21. 1 22.8 -6.9
Services 3,691 5,473 1.782 48.3 781 605 396 21.1 16.4 10·.1
Public Administration 1,678 1,827 149 6.9 355 -53 -153 21.1 -3.2 -9.1
Total 14.326 18,446 4.120 28.8 3.029 625 466 21.1 4.4 3.2
Source: Calculations by the authors based upon data from the Current Population Survey.
Note: Totals and percentages may not add exactly due to rounding.
Figure 3.E
DECOMPOSITION OF E.MPLOYMENT CHANGE"
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In summary, the occupational decomposition using the CPS data indicates
that clerical jobs have more than maintained their relative importance in the
economy from 1972 to 1982. In fact, both the effects of differential rates of
industry growth and change in staffing ratios were moderately positive. Thus,
clerical jobs were actually slightly more important at the end of the period
than at the beginning of the period. This confi~s the results in Section 1 on
the overview of clerical employment. However, 1982 ·was a recession year so
these results should be interpreted with caution. It is also true that some of
the major employers of clerical workers demonstrated negative staffing ratio
trends over this period. Finance, generally acknowledged to be the biggest
user of office automation today. experienced declining staffing ratios for
.clericals during this time period. So it is possible that office automation is
negatively impac~ing clerical jobs in selected sectors.
E. Conclusions
Since it appears to be impossible to directly link office automation to the
productivity gains of clerical workers, the decomposition methodology looks at
the changes in staffing patterns across industries as an indicator of the net
impact of technology and other factors on clerical employment over the time
period being examined. The net effect of changing staffing ratios on clerical
employment has been moderately positive in the last decade or so. Economy-wide
there appears to be little evidence that office automation has negatively
impacted clerica.l jobs in the pasto However, it does appear that staffing
ratios for clerical workers ar~ declining slightly 1n some sectors such as
finance. So, it is at least possible that office automation is raising the
productivity of clerical workers and thereby contributing to the falling
staffing ratios in those sectors.
The decomposition methodology also puts into proper perspective the
important roles that economic growth and the changing composition of industries
play in determining clerical employment. According to this analysis, clericaljob growth is significantly related to overall economic growth. This
conclusion should not be surprising, but many people find it all too easy to
discover other reasons which purportedly explain employment changes. In fact,
- not only is economic growth by far the most important factor in determining
clerical employment, but it appears that the correlation may be growing
stronger. If the last recession is a precursor of the future, clerical jobs
are becoming more like other j.obs in their sensitivity to general economic
conditions.
It is well-known that the changing composition of industries has tended to
favor clerical jobs. But the influence of industry mix was only moderately
positive during the 1970s, and some sectors which are heavy employers of
clericals have recently begun to experience much slower growth or even absolute
declines in total employment. This 1s particularly true for hospitals and
state and local government, the latter of which is the largest single employer
of clericals. So, even though other sectors, notably services, will likely
continue to be fast growing, there is no strong reason to think that industry
mix will playa more significant role in the future employment outlook for
clerical workers. .
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It is puzzling that the aggregate productivity data for finance and
insurance showed below average productivity growth for the sector as a whole,
yet the decomposition analysis showed declining staffing ratios for clerical
jobs within finance and insurance. Since clerical jobs are so important in
this sector, it is logical to think that falling staffing ratios for these jobs
might also be associated with realized productivity gains. But it should be
recalled that the aggregate productivity data may be seriously flawed, the loss
of jobs in this sector due to falling staffing ratios was relatively modest,
and there could have been offsetting employment gains elsewhere in the sector.
If nothing else, this review has demonstrated that there are,many unanswered
questions about employment trends for clericals in some sectors such as finance
and insurance.
The examination of the historical evidence on clerical jobs has been a
sobering experience. Clerical employment has grown rapidly in the last 40
years or so. But many factors appear to confirm that the growth of clericaljobs has slowed in the last decade. Based upon the review in this chapter, it
is difficult to see how anyone could expect much more than average growth for
clerical jobs in the future.
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IV. FORECASTS OF THE CLERICAL EMPLOYMENT IMPLICATIONS
OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
This paper heretofore has dealt exclusively with historical data. The
purpose of this section is to review the existing forecasts of the future
prospects for clerical jobs. The BLS occupatio"nal projections are the major
effort of the U.S. government to anticipate the needs for specific
occupations. As ~ll be seen shortly, the BLS.methodology is based on a
modeling framework that accounts for IIIIny".economic variab,les. The resulting
occupational projections are not neces~arily superior to others but they do
have the advantage of being'produced in a comprehensive and reasonably
consistent manner. '
Other forecasts that are much less comprehensive than the BLS efforts but
potentially useful are also reviewed. First, Wassi1y Leontief and Faye Duchin
of New York Universi ty have· produced an ana1ysi s of the impacts of automati on
on employment, 1963-2000. Second, the work of Matthew P. Drennan of Columbia
University is examined. He focuses on clerical jobs in six office industries,
primarily within the finance sector. Finally, the recent work of J. David
Roessner, Georgia Institute of Technology, is reviewed. Like Drennan, he
examines clerical jobs within the finance sector, but he focuses on only two
industries, banking and insurance.
A. BLS Occupational Employment" Projections
The BLS forecasting system is actually a group of separate projections
which are linked to each other for consis~ency. Aggregate econo~-wide
activity is forecast first. This includes labor force projections by age, race
and sex, and aggregate output decomposed into its major components, among other
variables. Due to BLS budget constraints and the large amount of staff time
necessary to maintain an aggregate econometric model, the most recent aggregate
forecasts were made using the existing model at Chase Econometrics, Inc. BLS
produced the forecasts using their own assumptions but accepted the economic
interrelations implicit in the Chase model. '
The second step in the BLS forecasting system is to develop industry output
projections that are consistent with the aggregate output projections of step
one. The l56-sector input-output model, prepared by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce, is used as a base for these
projections. Given a set of industry demand figures, an input-output model can
calculate the total industrial production required to meet those demands. The
BLS input-output system utilizes Hbridge tablesHto update the historical
input-output coefficients and to allow for anticipated shifts in demand for
inputs and/or outputs over the period of the projection.
Once the industry output projections are determined, then productivity
levels are forecast to arrive at total industry employment requirements. The
productivity gains are estimated separately for each industry utilizing an
econometric equation. Worker-hours are estimated as a function of the
industry's output, capacity utilization, relative price of labor, and (as a
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proxy for technology) the output/capital ratio. The implication of the
technology proxy is that more capital ,per unit of output implies the need for
less worker-hours. Finally, the estimates of total worker-hours are combined
with other estimates of average annual hours per person to arrive at the
industry employment levels.
'The last step in the BlS projections system is to forecast occupational
employment within these industry total' employment levels. The basis for these
projections are the, occupational staffing patterns from the latest Occupational
Employment Statistics· (OES) surveys. The individual occupational coefficients
are adjusted on a· judgmental basis to acct;)unt for the changes in occupational
demand anticipated as a result of technological change or other reasons. For
example, computer-related occupations will· likely become relatively more
important in many industries as computers are more widely applied in those
industries. So the coefficients for these occupations are increased
correspondingly. These revised staffing coefficients are then applied to the
previ ously forec'ast 1eve1 of industry total employment. The sum of the
employment across all industries for a given OES occupation then becomes the
new occupational employment projection of BlS.
Several features of the BLS system should be noted, particularly those that
relate to technological change. Technological change actually enters the
system in at 1east·three places. First, the industry output projections should
account for anticipated changes in demand induced by technological change.
Secondly, the estimated productivity gains forecast for each industry should be
influenced by technological change. Finally" the staffing patterns themselves
are altered directly to account for technological change. In other words,
technological change will have 'specific effects on some occupations, it will
have an overall impact on the productivity of workers, and it will affect the
demand for goods' and services generally.
It is worthy of note. that this system involves a considerable amount ofjudgment, especially in anticipating the effects of technological change.
There are no simple equations that predict changes in staffing ratios within an
industry. In fact, the BlS staff has found that trends in industry employment
levels can be predicted more accurately than the changes in occupational
employment (Kutscher, 1982: 8, and Office of Economic Growth and Employment
Projections, 1981). This is due in large part to the difficulty of projecting
specific occupational impacts of technological change.
One of the prima~ motivations in developing the occupational decomposition
as an analytical tool earlier is its usefulness in evaluating the BlS·
occupational projections. Note that the last step in the BLS methodology is to
change the staffing ratios in the fndust~ occupation matrix to account for
technological change and other factors. In other words, BLS takes the best
industrial demand and productivity forecast that it can muster and converts
that into projections of total employment· by industry. Then it considers
changing the staffing ratios from their historical levels. Thus, by using the
historical staffing ratios from the base period of the BLS projections, the
occupational decomposition will measure the extent to which BLS expects
staffing ratios to change over the cou~se of the projection. .
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In Section III the historical employment trends for the 10 BLS input-output
industries which account for the largest number of clerical jobs were
reviewed. Those 10 industries employed about two-thirds of all clerical
workers in 1982. Thus it should be clear that the fortunes of these industries
will have a major impact on the employment of clerical workers in the years
ahead. In this section we review the BLS projections of employment for these
industries. It provides an opportunity to evaluate the industry forecasts
independent of their occupational content. Since the occupational
decomposition summarizes the effects of differences in the rates of growth of
all industries, the focus here is limited to the 10 industries responsible for
the most clerical jobs.
The combined employment trends for the top 10 industries in terms of
clerical employment are presented in Figure 4.A, while the employment trends
for each of those 10 industries follows in Table 4.1. The figure depicts the
historical growth trends, 1967-1982, as well as the projected growth trends,
1983-1995. The data are reported in index number form to emphasize the
relative growth of the industries. The total employment trend for all 105
industries is also presented to facilitate the comparison of the growth of each
industry to the overall growth of employment.
In the past the industries with the most clerical jobs have been much
faster growing than the average for all industries. But the magnitude of that
positive differential was reduced sharply in the 1970s and BLS does "not expect
it to reappear by 1995. If these projections are correct, the 10 industries
which account for about two-thirds of all clerical jobs will grow at roughly
the same rate as all jobs over the period of 'the projection.
It is natural for the combined growth trend of all 10 industries to mask
some important differences among the industries. The figures for the
individual industries reveal that the laggards in te~s of industry growth are
state and local government and the federal government. Employment by the
federal government is not expected to·increase at all, while state and local
government are expected to reverse the declines suffered in the 1980-82
recession and grow once again, albeit significantly more slowly than average.
The fastest growing industries among the top 10 employers of clerical
workers are credit agencies and commodity brokers, hospitals, miscellaneous
business services, and banking. Of these, one of the more surprising
projections is the growth anticipated for banking, which outgrows the overall
economy throughout the period of the projection. Considerable attention has
been focused on banking employment in the last couple of years, and it does.
appear that the industry is experiencing significant structural change due to
deregulation, among other factors. The closing of branch or satellite banks,
especially in such states as California. and employment declines 1." a few of
the largest banks in the nation, has contributed to speculation that the growth
of banking employment may slow. There is also the question of the impacts of
office automation equipment such as automatic teller machines. In contrast,
deregulation has also increased the number of financial services banks provide,
so it is possible to argue that banking employment will continue to grow. We
TOP 10 INDUSTRIES
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Credit
State & t4isc. Misc. Social Agencies & Total Total
local Retail Wholesale Federal Business Services Comodity Top 10 All 105
Year Government Trade Trade Banking Government Insurance Services Hospitals &Museums Brokers Industries Industries
1967 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 lOa 100 100 100
1968 105 104 102 ·106 101 103 107 106 105 109 104 103
1969 109 108 106 114 102 104 118 113 103 118 108 106
1970 113 110 108 121 99 108 122 118 103 116 111 106
1971 117 112 109 124 98 108 122 126 110 116 113 107
1972 122 115 112 129 97 110 131 137 11~ 122 117 110
1973 127 118 117 136 96 113 145 143 114 126 121 115
1974 131 119 120 144 98 117 153 151 116 127 124 117
1975 131 115 126 147 98 119 157 158 125 128 127 115
1976 139 119 130 151 98 121 168 164 128 132 130 118
1977 142 123 135 156 97 127 183 170 130 140 134 122
1978 148 128 142 164 97 133 204 177 134 151 140 129
1979 151 130 149 173 98 139 225 183 137 161 144 133
1980 154 129 150 181 99 143 239 192 139 168 147 133
1981 153 130 153 188 97 145 253 203 139 179 148 134
1982 151 129 151 191 97 147 256 210 13~ 184 148 132
1983 148 130 155 190 97 145 218 227 137 204 150 132
1984 150 136 160 194 96 149 286 230 141 204 153 136
1985 152 141 163 201 97 154 302 239 145 212 157 140
1986 153 145 166 207 96 158 319 248 149 220 161 143
1987 155 149 169 211 96 162 333 256 152 225 164 146
1988 158 152 171 216 96 166 344 262 155 230 167 150
1989 161 156 172 221 97 171 355 269 158 236 171 153
1990 164 159 172 225 98 174 368 276 160 243 174 154
1991 167 164 174 228 99 177 366 276 162 240 176 158
1992 168 168 178 234 99 180 314 281 164 143 179 161
1993 169 170 181 238 99 183 389 288 165 249 182 164
1994 171 172 184 241 99 184 410 297 166 258 185 166
1995 172 172 185 244 99 184 445 312 166 274 188 169
Source: Calculations by the authors based upon data from BlS.
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think that BLS will moderate the anticipated growth trend for banking in the
next round of forecasts •
. The decomposition of the BLS occupational employment projections at the
major group level are presented in Table 4.2 and summarized graphically in
Figure 4.B. In general, it is clear that BLS anticipates strong occupational
employment growth for most occupations over the course of the projection.[22]
In fact, at this level of aggregation, only three of the eight occupations are
slower growing than the average for all occupations, namely operatives,
laborers, and clerical workers. However. the range of the growth rates for the
occupations around the average growth rate of all jobs is relatively narrow,
fram 19.1 percent to 38.5 percent. Compare that to the range from the CPS
data, 1972 to 1982 of -5.9 percent to 46.9 percent, or 1972 to 1979 (to avoid
the distortions in the data due to the recession) of 8.5 percent to 35.4
percent. Apparently BLS anticipates less relative change in the importance of
occupations over the 13 years of their projection than actually occurred during
the seven years from 1972 to 1979.
Given these overall results. it is not surprising that the occupational
decomposition indicates that the relative impacts of changing staffing ratios
and differential rates of industry growth are modest for all occupations. The
surprise in the decomposition is that the impact of staffing ratios on forecast
clerical employment is actually negative•. In fact. this is the only turnaround
projected by BLS from the existing trends in the historical data. It appears
to be an indication that BLS expects office automation to retard the growth of
clerical jobs in the future.
It is possible to compare the historical CPS data with the projections of
BLS at the major occupational group level. but one of the difficulties with
such a comparison is that the time spans covered are of such unequal length.
Figures 4.C and 4.0 attempt to remedy this problem by stating the staffing
ratio changes and the effects of differential rates of industry growth for the
major occupational groups in terms of average annual rates of change. The
comparisons are done over two historical time periods. 1972-1979 and 1972-1982
to ameliorate as much as possible distortions in the data due to the
recession. It should be noted that the unemployment rate in 1979 was just
under 6 percent, virtually the same unemployment rate built into the BLS
projectionse Overall this approach facilitates a more direct comparison of the
BLS projections with the historical data using a consistent unit of
measurement.
The results depicted in Figures 4.C and 4.0 indicate unequivocally that BLS
anticipates far less impact in the years ahead from staffing ratio changes and
22. The BLS does not actually forecast occupational employment growth at the
major group level, but it is still helpful to analyze the projections at this
level of aggregation to provide an overview of the system. It also enables us
to compare those projections to the historical CPS data reviewed in Section 3.
!able 4.2
BL? PRQ.J_ECTEO OCCUPAT19NAL EMPLOYMENT GROWTH, 1982- 1995
Decomposition of Employment Changes, 1982-1995
Employment Changes
Absolute Changes Percent of 1982 Occupational Employment
Occupation DifferentialChange in Change in Constant Rates of Differential
1982 1995 Employment Employment Employinent Industry Staffing Cons tant Rates of
Employment Employment 1982-1995 1982-1995 Shares Growth Ratios Employment Indus try Staffing(thousands) (thousands) (thousands) (percent) (thousands) (thousands) (thousands) Shares Growth Ratios
Professional, technical 15,071" 20,177 5,106 33.9 4,228 -99 977 28.1 -0.7 6.5
Managers, officials 7,696 10,659 2,963 38.5 2,159 162 642 28.1 2.1 8.3
Sales workers 5,906 7,704 1,798 30.4 1,657 141 0 28.1 2.4 0.0
Clerical workers 18,717 23,673 4,957 26.5 5,251 295 -588 28.1 1.6 -3.1
Craft and Related Workers 10,133 13,223 3,089 30.5 2,843 36 211 28.1 0.4 2.1
Operatives 12,504 14,896 2,392 19.1 3,508 -566 -550 28.1 -4.5 -4.4
laborers, nonfanm 5,572 6,794 1,222 21.9 . 1,563 -203 -139 28.1 -3.6 -2.5
Service workers 15,318 19,727 4,408 28.8 4,297 580 -469 28.1 3.8 -3.1
Total 91,950 117,745 25,795 28.1
Source: Calculations by the authors based upon data tape from the 1982-1995 OES/BLS occupational employment projections.
Note: Some occupationa~ detail is omitted. Totals and percentages may not add exactly due to omission of some occupational detail and rounding error.
The 3780ES industries were first aggregated to 105 industries before accomplishing the decomposition. The OES data tape includes wage and salary
employment only.
Figure 4.8
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differential rates of industry growth than have occurred in the last decade.
'For most of the major occupational groups, the average annual rate of change
during' the projection period tends to be less th~n one-half the average annual
rate of change' during either of the· historical periods, 1972-1979 or
1972-1982. Again, the most important. exception is probably the turnaround in
the effects of staffing. ratios on clerical employment. But it should be
mentioned that the impacts of changi.ng '.staffing ratios on clerical employment
have been modest historically as well. Nonetheless it is interesting that
staffing ratio changes fQr 'clerical: Workers are· predicted to change from
sli~htly positive historical~y to slightly negative 'during the projection
per10d. " "
There are 673 occupations with 5,000 or' more employees in the detailed
occupation-industry matrix of the BlS. Of those, there are 95 occupations that
fall within the major occupational group of clerical workers. The BlS
projected occupational employment growth for all 95 of these occupations is
reported in Table 4.3. The decomposition of the projected occupational
employment growth into the portions due to overall employment expansion,
differential industry growth, and staffing ratio changes is also reported in
the table.
The message of ~is analysis is that the detailed clerical occupations
differ widely in terms of their growth rates and staffing ratio changes. The
range in the overall forecast growth rate of the 95 deta'il ed clerical
occupations is from a positive 76.1 percent to minus 20 percent. The range in
the staffing ratio changes is from plus 38.4 percent to minus 55.6 percent.
The diversity in the results indicates that BlS is, attempting to capture a
variety of influences on the level of occupational demand. It is clearly
erroneous to think that BlS 1s unwilling to alter staffing ratios from their
historical levels. It is hoped that BLS will be more open 1n the future about
explaining the judgments which were made in adj~usting staffing ratios, however.
The analysis of specific occupations is difficult because of the sheer
number of those occupations. The discussion here is limited to the largest,
the fastest growi,ng, and the decl ining occupations. The three largest
occupations are general office clerks, secretaries, and cashiers. There are no
discernible technologica'l impacts on employment trends in these occupations.
However, it is noteworthy that the staffing ratios for cashiers is expected to
increase significantly contributing to the overall 48.2 percent growth forecast
for that occupation. The growth of the other two occupations is much closer to
the average for all clerical workers.
It is also interesting that'the effects of staffing ratio changes for
secretaries are expected to be slightly negative. Looking at the effects of
staffing ratios alone, the occupational decomposition indicates a projected
decline in employment from 1982 levels of .2.3 percent, but the effects of
differential rates of industry growth more than make up for this loss. The net
result is that secretaries are ~xpected to grow slightly faster than all
occupations.
Table 4.3
~LS. ~jected Ocaapadoaal Employment GrowtIL. 1981-1995
AD Cerical Occupations
~ 01 • ....,........ 1982-1995
......,...cllaqes
PeneIIt 011912
AIIIoIIde .... «c.pltl.....,1.,..111
DIIfereDCW
o.ae- a-ce ill ea.taIIt ...., ........
1912 1'" -..,..tna""'.pIoytaeDt ......, SbdIIII eo.taIII ratel .,
0caIpad0e ..I.,.........,... 1982-1995 1982-1995 ..... IfOWda radGI """.1It ......., StaIIq .
.... ....... .(I0OI) (peIaM) ~ ... (.... .... ....... n~OI
0erIcaI w.t.s •••.•••• Q • 0 ••• ~. 11,716.6 11,673.5 ~ 26.5 5,25U 294.1 C5IIA 21.1 L6 co11
Adjustment clerks ..........'••••• 33.1 41~4 13.6 .«).1 9.5 0.3 3.1 21.1 0.9 ti.2
Admissions evaluators •••.•••••• 10.5 . 12~'1 106 .5.4 2..9 (1.8) 0.5 21.1 -11.3 4.7
Bank tellers ... 0 ................. 531.1 693.0 154.2 28.6 151.1 24.1 (21.0) 21.1 4.5 ",].9
New accounts teDen .•. 0 0 ••• 0 •• 61.3 79.9 12.6 11.8 18.9 4.1 (10.3) 21.1 6.0 -IS,,3
Tellers .......... ·.................. 411.5 613." 141.6 30.0 132.3 20.1 (10.7) 21.1 4.3 <'2~3
Bookkeepers et aceounuq clerks . 1,613.5 1.891.5 279.1 17.3 452.6 -46.7 (220.2) 28.1 2.9 r-13 ..6
Accounting clerks ............. 728.7 850.0 121.3 16.7 204.4 6.2 (89.3) 21.1 0.9 ·,,12,,3
Bookkeepers, hand ............ 884.8 1.042.5 157.7 17.8 248.2 40.4 (130.9) 21.1 4.6 0 14.8
Brokerage clerks ................ 16.5 20.3 3.8 23.0 4.6 3.1 (3.9) 28.1 18.5 .,23,,5
Car rental clerks ............••. 16.2 21.6 5.4 33.3 4.6 2.5 (1.6) 21.1 15.1 .,9.9
Cashiers ....................... 1,532.4 2.270.5 738.1 48.2 429.9 56.6 251.6 28.1 3.7 i6.4
Checkinl clerks .•• ., •••••••••••• 11.0 22.7 4.7 26.2 S.O 0.5 (0.8) 28.1 2.7 -4.5
Circulation clerks ...... ., .• ., ••••• 9.5 11.8 2.3 23.8 2.7 (0.8) 0.4 21.1 -8.4 4.2
Claims adjusters . 0.............. 65.4 97.6 32.1 49.1 18.4 (4.0) 17.8 28.1 -6.2 27.3
Claims clerks .••.•••..•.•.••••• 63.0 89.8 26.8 42.5 1707 (4.2) 13.3 28.1 -6.7 :lLl
Claims examiner. iDSUrlJlCe ., ••••• 47.3 61.1 14.9 31.5 13.3 (0.9) 2.6 28.1 -2.0
Clerical supervisors' 0 ••••• 0 •••••• 466.1 621.4 161.3 34.6 130.7 13.4 17.2 28.1 2.9
Coin machine operators
and currency sorten 0 •••••••••• 5.0 6.0 0.9 18.2 1.4 .0 (0.5) 21.1 0.4 <>Ht3
Collectorst bill" account ...•.... 90..9 130.9 40.0 44.0 25.5 16.5 (2.0) 28.1 18.1
Court clerks ..•.... 0 ••••••• ~ .... 27.3 29.4 ' 2.2 7.9 7.7 (4.7) (0.8) 21.1 -17.3 ..2.9
Credit authorizers...........••.. 20.2 30.5 10.3 51.2 5.7 0.6 4.0 28.1 3.1 20.0
Credit clerkst bankinI
and insurance.................. 49.6 76.4 26.8 54.0 13.9 5.5 7.4 21.1 11.1
Credit reporters ..................... 1'.3 20.' 5.2 34.4 4.3 4.7 (3..7) 28.1 - 30.8
Customer service representatives., • 11.9, 123.8 34.8 39.2 .25.0 3.4 6.5 28.1 3.8
Customer service reps••
print.. and publish............ 11 •••• 8.4 10.3 1.9 22.2 2.4 (0.5) (.0) 21.1 -5.4 -0.5
Desk clerks, bowlina floor ........ 0 15..4 17.1 2.4 IS.4 4.3 1.1 (3.0) 28.1 7.0 -19.7
Desk clerks. ex. bowling floor. • •• . 85.3 104.3 19.0 22.3 23.9 5.0 (9.9) 28.1 5.1 -11.6
Dispatchers, police. rll'e
and ambulance..•.••.. 0 ........ 47.8 '3.4 5.' 11.6 13.4 (7.9) (.0) 28.1 -16.5 .0
Dispatchers. vehide serv. or work . 86.9 .109.7 22.8 26.3 24.4 0.1 (1.7) 28.1 0.2 "'2~O
Eligibility workers. welfare .••.•• 3105 32.1 0.6 2.0 8.8 ($.4) (2.1) 28.1 -17.1 ..9i.O
File clerks ...•••••••..•••••..•. 193.0 319.5 26.5 9.1 82.2 21.3 (71.0) 28.1 7.3 -26.3
General clerks, office .•••..••••. 2,342.0 3,037..4 695.5 29.7 657.0 20.6 17.1 28.1 0.9 0.8
In-(tle operators. 0 ............ 0 •• 5.0 6.9 1.9 38.1 1.4 2.8 (2.2) 28.1 55.6 M.9
Insurance checkers .............. 14~9 22.4 7.4 49.8 4.2 (0.3) 3.5 28.1 -2.0 23.7
Insurance clerks. except medical ... 10.6 14.6 4.0 31.6 3.0 0.6 0.4 28.1 5.7 3.9
Insurance clerks. medical ......•• 85..7 139.1 53.4 62.2 24.1 15.9 13.4 28.1 18.S IS.'
Ubrary usistallts .•••....•.••. 0 • 10.2· M.6 14.4 18.0 22.5 (10.8) 2.7 28.1 -13.4 3.4
Lic:ease clerks •••••••..••••••••• 5.7 5.5 (0.2) .....0 1.6 (1.0) (0.8) 28.1 -17.3 014.7
Loan closers .................... 45.3 64.0 11.8 41.5 12.7 4.2 1.9 28.1 9.2 4.2
Mail carriers. postal clerks •••••• 5«».6 474..4 (".2) -12.2 151.7 (108.1) (109.7) 28.1 -20.0 -20.3
Postal mail carriers ............. 234.1 222.7 (11.4) .....9 65.1 (-46.8) (30.3) 28.1 -20.0 -12.9
Postal service clerks .•...••••.. 306.5 251.8 (54.8) -17.9 86.0 (61.3) (79.5) 21.1 -20.0 025.9
Mail clerks .................... 98.7 129.7 31.0 31.4 27.7 1.2 2.2 28.1 1.2 2.2
Messengers ...................... A9.7 65.4 15.8 31.8 13.9 4.6 (2.7) 28.1 9.2 -5.5
Meter readers, utilities .......... 30.5 37.9 7.3 24.0 8.6 (1.5) 0.3 28.1 -4.9 0.9
Mortgage closins clerks ......... . 15.3 22.6 7.2 47.2 4.3 1.7 1.3 21.1 10.8 8.4
Office machine operators ..,...... 933.6 t,I94.6 260.9 27.9 261.9 73.7 (74.7) 28.1 7.9 08.0
BookkeePing" billinl OperatOR. 226.1 289.9 63.8 _ 28.2 63.4 3.7 (3.4) 28.1 1.7 01.5
Bookkeepinl, billing
machine operators ........... 171.5 221.7 SO.2 29.3 48.1 3.4 (1.3) 28.1 2.0 ~.8
Proof machine operators ...... 47.4 59.4 11.9 25.2 13.3 0.3 (1.6) 28.1 0.6 -3.4
Transit clerks ................ 7.3 8.9 1.6 22.6 2.0 0.1 (0.5) 28.1 0.9 -6.4
TIItIe 4.3 (COIItJ
~c:IIuIces ~doII of • ....,.. cJauaea, 1982-1995
Peraat oll982
AIIIaItde c:IIuIces 0ClCIIf8....~t
........
C1IMIe- CIIIIIae -
e...- ..... DIIItnadaI
191% 1915 ..-,.••....,.••t -,_.,..1• ......, .... e...- ra_"
0caIpa'- -._.,....._.,..1It ·1912-1995 1912-1995 .... ....... . fact. ......,... ......, SIafIIIc :
CCMMW .... ... ... .... (IOtW (.... .... ....... ra'"
Computer operatiq persoIIIlCI •• 578.7 735.9 157.2 27.2 162.3 57.3 . (62.5) '28.1 9.9 -10.8
Computer operators •••••••••• 210.0 369.7 159.7 76.1 51.9 20.1 10.7 21.1 9.6 38.4
Data eacry operaIOII •••••••••• 311.7 214.6 (34.1) ·10.7 ".,.4 30.6 (154.1) 28.1 9.6 4.4
pea;pa.u BOP .equipmeat
operaIOII •••••••••••••••••• 47.7 71.6 30.1 M.6 13.4 6.6 '·10.9 21.1 13.7 22.1
DupIic:adq IIIIICbiDe operators •• 36.1 G.3 6.2 17.1 10~1 3.1 (7.8) 21.1 10.6 -21 •.5
AU other office IIIIICbiDe opn••.. 19.0 121.1 32.1 36.1 25.0 1.1 (1.0) 21.1 9.9 ·1.1
Order clerks •••••••••••.••••••• 257.0 325." 8.4 26.6 72.1 (3.0) (0.7). 21.1 -1.2 '().3
Payroll. timeteepiq clerks ••••• 201.2 268.8 67.6 33.6 56." 6.6 ...5 21.1 3.3 2c2
Personnel clerks.. ""0•"••• "•••• " 102.3 131.0 28.7 21.0 28.7 (3.3) 3.3 21.1 -3.3 3,,2
Policy chance clerks ......•••• "• 27.6 30•.5 2.9 10.5 7.7 (0.6) (4.3) 28.1 -2.0 01.5.6
Procurement clerks ............. 46.9 .59.0 12.2 25.9 13.2 (1.9) (0.9) 28.1 -4.1 2.0
Production clerks ..........•.•. 199.8 260.0 60.2 . 30.1 56.0 1.9 2.2 28.1 1.0 1.1
Proofreaders •••••.......•..•.. 16.2 20.6 4.3 26.8 4.5 (0.4) 0.2 28.1 -2.6 1.3
Protective sipal operaton•....•. 6.9 11.7 4.8 69." 1.9 3.8 (1.0) 28.1 55.6 ..1~.3
PurcJwe. sales clerks. security •• 5.2 4.9 (0.3) -5.5 1.5 1.0 (2.7) 28.1 18.5 -52.0
Rate clerks. freilht .............. 10.2 12.5 2.3 22.6 2.9 (0.7) 0.2 21.1 ·7.2 1.8
Raters •••••••••••.•••••••••••. .52.6 69.0 16.4 31.1 14.8 (1.1) 2.7 28.1 -2.0 S..O
RaJ estate clerks •••••••.•••••••• 16.6 23.5 6.9 41.1 ".7 1.0 1.2 28.1 6.2 7.S
Recepdoailts ••••••.•.•••••••.• 381.1 569.7 188.6 49.5 106.9 54.2 27.5 28.1 1".2 1.2
Restnatioa qeats and
tI1IIIIPOft. dct. clerks .••••••••• 107.5 1O!f.6 2.1 I.' 30.2 (8.5) (19.5) 21.1 -7.9 ..18.2
Restnatioa apIlts .......••••. 52.9 54.9 2.0 3.7 14.8 (3.0) (9.9) 21.1 -5.7 -18.6
Ticket Aaents ................ 0• 49.3 48.9 (0.4) -0.7 13.8 (5.2) (8.9) 28.1 -10.6 -1802
Travel counselors. auto club 0••• 5.4 5.9 0.5 9.1 1.5 (0.3) (0..8) 28.1 -5.1 -13.9
Safe deposit clerks .............. 13.9 18.1 4.2 30.5 3.9 0.3 .0 28.1 2.4 .0
Secretaries and steDOIf'I.phen •.•. 2.634.8 3.337.3 702.5 26.7 739.1 9"!.3 (133.9) 28.1 3.7 -S.1
Secretaries .................... 2.298.7 2.988.5 689.8 30.0 644.8 98.3 (53.3) 28.1 4.3 . ",2..3
SteDOp1lphers •••••••••••••••• 26.5.6 244.9 (20.7) -7.8 74.5 (1.8) (87.4) 28.1 -2.9 ·32,,9
Typists ••••••••••••••••••••••• 974.9 1.121.8 153.9 15.1 273.5 2.0 (121.6) 28.1 0.2 ·12.5
SerYic:e clerks •••••••••••••••••• 23.6 34.9 11.3 41.1 6.6 .0.8 ".0. 28.1 3.2 1649'
Sbippina Uld receiviDI clerks ••••• 364.3 430." 66.1 11.2 102.2 (1.4) (28.7) 28.1 -2.0 -'.9
Shippina packers ••••••••••••••• 339.0 ~.I 63.1 11.6 95.1 (15.2) (16.1) 28.1 -4.5 ...S.O
Sortiq c:lerb. baDkiDa••• 0•••••• 704 9.3 1.9 25.5 2.1 0.1 (0.3) 28.1 1.5 -4.1
Sta~entderks ...•••..•.•••.• 33.6 44.2 10.7 31.7 9." 0.1 0." 28.1 2.3 1.3
Statistical clerks •.••••••.••••••. 96.1 110.8 1".7 15.3 27.0 5.7 (li.O) 28.1 S.9 -18.7
Stock clerks. stockroom
and wuehouse .•......•.....•. 827.3 983.5 156.3 18.9 232.1 0.9 (16.7) 28.1 0.1 -9.3
Survey workers .•.•••.•...•.... 51.4 76.1 24.8 48.2 1".4 21.7 (11.4) 28.1 42.3 -22.1
Switchboard oper./receptionists .. 203.8 281.6 71.9 .31.2 57.2 18.5 2.2 28.1 9.1 101
Tea.chers' aides ................. 462.7 593.1 130.3 28.2 129.8 (69.4) 70.0 28.1 -15.0 15.1
Telephone ad takers. newspapers • 10.4 1".5 ".2 «1.5 2.9 (0.9) 2.2 28.1 -8.8 2L2
Telqrapb operators ........... 0• 4.4 6.4 2.0 46.1 1.2 0.3 0.5 28.1 7.5 10.6
Telepholle operators ••..•••.•••. 315.8 341.4 25.5 8.1 11.6 36.6 (99.7) 28.1 11.6 -31.6
Switchboard operators .•.•••••• 169.6 211.3 "1.7 2A.6 "7.6 25.7 (31.6) 28.1 15.1 .,18.6
Central offtee operators .••••••• 108.7 86.9 (21.1) -20.0 30.5 8.1 (fiG.4) 28.1 7.5 -55.6
Directory assistance operaton ••• 37.5 "3.1 5.6 14.9 10.5 2.8 (1.7) 28.1 7.5 ..20.6
ntle searchers o •••••••••••••••• 5.1 7.1 2.0 310S 1.4 0." 0.2 28.1 7.4 3.1
Towa clerks ...................... 26.0 29.1 3.1 11.7 7.3 (4.5) 0.3 28.1 -17.3 1.0
Traffte aaents..................... 17.8 22.3 4.5 25.1 5.0 (0.6) 0.1 28.1 -3.3 0.4
Traffte clerks ...... 0............... 7.1 10.5 3.3 41.0 2.0 2.5 (1.1) 28.1 35.1 ...16.9
Transportalioa apnts.............. 20.6 28.1 7.5 36.3 5.8 (0.1) I~I 28.1 -0.6 8.9
Wei&hers......................... 24.3 28.7 4.3 17.8 6.8 (2.6) 0.1 28.1 -10..5 0.3
Welfare investiptors .............. 11.8 12.3 0.5 ".0 3.3 (2.0) (0.8) 28.1 -17.1 -7.0
Worksheet clerks .................... 10.6 15.3 4.7 44.1 3.0 (0.2) 1.9 28.1 -2.0 U1.1
All other clerical workers ......... 1.220.5 1•.542.0 321.6 26.3 342.4 (14.0) (6.1) 28.1 -1.1 '().6
SOURCE: Calculations by the authon bued upon data tape from the 1982·1995 OESlBLS occupational employment projections.
NOTE: Some occupational detail is omitted. Totals and percen. may not add exactly due to omission of some occupational detaitand roundilll error.. The
378 OES industries were fint aureaated to lOS industries before accomplishilll the decomposition. The OES data tape includes waae and salary employment
only.
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The fastest growing clerical jobs are expected to be computer operators,
claims adjusters, insurance checkers, peripheral EDP equipment operators,
telephone ad takers, claims clerks, and credit authorizers. All are expected
to have staffing ratio 1111Pacts equivalent to in~reases in employment levels of
20 percent or more. Bes'ides the obvious technolog1'cal impacts of computers on
this list, it may be important to note that ~ny .of these occupations require
the worker to interact in some way with the customer that· is being served.
That may provide a clue as to why BLS thinks secretaries will not decline in
importance, or perhaps why cashiers are the 10th fastest g~ng occupation.
Again a world of both high-tech and high-touch is anticipated.
Turning to the clerical' occupations which are declining the most in terms
of their staffing ratios, the single greatest decline is projected for central
office telephone operators. This;s followed by security purchase and sales
clerks, data entry operators, in-file operators, stenographers, file clerks,
and postal service clerks.' All are projected to have a staffing ratio impact
~quivalent to reductions in employment of 25 percent or more. Most of these
occupations have been declining historically as well, so there are not really
many surprises. BlS thinks that the decline in the relative importance of file
.clerks will continue in the years ahead, thus continuing the trend established
in the 1970s. But this occupation is expected to grow slowly on an absolute
basis. In general, it is worth reiterating once again that it is easier to
provide a technological explanation for the declining occupations than for many
of the growin·g occupations.
B. Leo"tief and Ouchi" Study
Wassily Leontief and Faye Ouch;n have attempted to isolate the impact of
computer-based technologies on employment by industry and occupation in The
Impacts of Automation on E~loyment 1963-2000 (19841. They utilize a -
comprehensive input-outPut~ramewo~ with four separate but interrelated.
matrices. The model is dynamic in that investment is a function of output
changes in the individual producing·sectors. The Leontief-Duchin study begins
with the various SEA input/output tables and the census-based employment data
by occupation. The key forecasting task is to alter the individual technical
coefficients to account for the new computer-based automation.
The technological assessment is limited to computer-based technologies,
specifically robots, computers, CNC machine tools, electronic office equipment,
electronic education devices, and the industries which will use the
aforementioned equipment. The technological forecasting is open in that the
assumptions are clearly stated and based primarily upon the expert judgment of
the researchers. The overall model is then driven by the same final demand
forecast used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in the OES occupational
projection effort, except for allowing greater investment in computer-based
technologies where the authors deem appropriate.
It is important to emphasize at the outset that one of the assumptions in
the Leontief-Duchin study is that no technical change outside computer-based
technologies is allowed to affect future employment levels. This leads to
dramatic gains in employment for occupations that are largely unaffected by
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these technologies such as farmers, bakers, truckers, etc. While this
assumption isolates the pure impact of computers in a modeling sense, the
Leontief-Duchin approach seriously limits the usefulness of the occupational
employment projections. Since balanced sectoral expansion is also assumed,
obviously the growth of output in non-automated sectors requires massive
infusions of labor to produce that output.
One of the most dramatic illustrations of the impacts of this assumption
occurs for lEA occupational group 153, Farmers and Farm Workers. According to
the Leontief-Duchin presentation, one might be led to expect that the long
secular decline in job opportunities for farm workers has ended, as shown in
Figure 4.E. In fact, it appears that this will be a significant growth
occupation in the future. Of course, no one really predicts such a result. It
occurs because of the construction of the Leontief-Duchin model.
Specifically, in the case of agricultural workers, the expansion of final
demand for foodstuffs along with other goods and services (balanced sectoral
expansion) combined with no increases in labor productivity leads to
substantial increases in the demand for farm workers. Labor productivity gains
for farm workers are zero because most farm work is presumably not amenable to
the utilization of computer-based technologies, the only source of productivity
growth allowed for in the Leontief-Duchin framework. Clearly, this is purely
an artifact of the model and should not be regarded as a projected occupational
trend. In fact, nearly eve~one assumes that the phenomenal increases in
productivity in agricultural production will continue so that future food
supplies will be generated without substantial increases in human resource
inputs. To repeat, Leontief-Duchin assume no productivity increases in the
economic system other than" those induced by-Computer-based technologies.
The Leontief-Duchin employment projections utilize four different scenarios
which differ in their technological assumptions. Scenario 51 is the baseline
scenario; it assumes no further automation or any other technological change
after 1980. Scenarios S2 and 53 are identical to 51 through 1980 but 53
assumes more rapid adoption of computer-based technologies than S2 thereafter.
Since the BLS estimates of demand drive the model, Scenario S1, with no
productivity gains, generates employment estimates that are far beyond
reasonable projections of the labor force available. It turns out that both S2
and 53 do so as well (i.e., there are more jobs anticipated than people to fill
those jobs) although S3 is closer to realistic projections of the labor force
than S2. The fourth and final scenario in the Leontief-Duchin study, 54,
adjusts the level of demand for labor downward (using the composition of demand
from 53) until it is just consistent with the labor supply which will likely be
available to produce that output (i.e., full employment). The employment
estimates from 54 are used here in reviewing the Leontief-Duchin study.
The Leontief-Duchin projections for employment in the maj·or occupational
groups are presented in Table 4.4. The time period selected is for 1982-1995
to facilitate comparison with the BLS projections. The occupational
decomposition in the table is limited to the constant employment shares and all
other structural change, thus combining the effects of staffing ratios and
differential rates of industry growth. However, this is not likely to be a
Figure 4.E
EMPLOYMENT OF FARMERS
LEONTIEF-DUCHIN STUDY, 1963 TO 2000
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lEONTIEf-DUCHIN PROJECTED OCCUPATIONAL GROWTUL-l982-199~
MAJOR OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS
Decomposition of Clertcal Employmen~ Changes. 1982-1995
Emp1oyment Changes
-
Absolute Changes Percent of 1982 Employment
Occupation Change in Change in Constant Other
1982 1995 . EIOp1oyment Employment Employment Structural Constant Other
Employment Employment 1982-1995 1982-1995 Shares Change* Employment Structural(thousands) (thousands) (thousands) (percent) (thousands) (thousands) Shares Change*
Professionals 16.292 25.858 9.566 58.1 5.538 4.028 34.0 24.1
Managers 11.218 12.484 1.266 11.3 3.813 (2.548) 34.0 -22.7
Sales 6.861 9.328 2,466 36.0 2.332 134 34.0 2.0
Clerical 18.032 11.786 (246) -1.4 6.129 (6.375) 34.0 -35.4
Craftsmen 15.314 21.554 6.240 40.1 5.206 1.034 '34.0 6.7
Operatives 17.852 23.945 6.093 34.1 6.069 24 34.0 0.1
Service 12.909 20.023 7.114 55.1 4.388 2.725 34.0 21.1
laborers, 5.535 8.015 2.480' 44.8 1.882 598 34.0 10.8
Farmers 3.210 4.761 1.491 45.6 1.112 319 34.0 11.6
Total 107.284 143.753 36.469 34.0
Source: Calculations by the authors based upon data kindly provided by Faye Duchin.
Note: Totals and percentages may not add exactly due to omission of some occupational detail and rounding error.
*Other structural change includes the combined effects of changes in staffing ratios and differential rates of industry growth.
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serious problem since Leontief-Duchin use the final demand forecast of BLS, for
which it has already been shown that the impacts of differences in the rates of
growth of industries is relatively modest. The real differences between the
BLS and the Leontief-Duchin projections arise from the assumed changes in the
staffing ratios as well as the assumption of no productivity growth other than
that connected with computer-based technologies.
An examination of the employment projections for the major occupational
groups in Table 4.4 clearly illustrates the impacts of assuming no general
productivity ga1ns. The employment-growth rate for farmers is nearly 46
percent, about one-third higher than the growth of all jobs. service workers
also show fantastic increases. This latter result ~ appear less unreasonable
since it is part of conventional wisdom that service sector jobs have been the
major growth sector for the last 20 years or more. However, the estimates in
the Leontief-Duchin study result from the same assumptions as in the case of
the farm workers.
What is most significant from the standpoint of this study is that
Leontief-Duchin project an absolute decline in the employment of clerical
workers as well as very slow growth in managers. Regardless of the problems in
interpreting the projections that emanate from this model, if Leontief-Duchin
are at all correct, it could mean not only displacement·for large numbers of
clerical workers but also portend difficulties for those workers seeking higher
level positions in the office.
The Leontief-Duchin study disaggregates total clerical jobs into five
specific clerical occupations, namely secretaries, office machine operators,
bank tellers, phone operators, and cashiers, plus a sixth category for all
other clericals. The projections for these jobs are shown in Table 4.5 using
the same fo~at as shown for the major occupational groups. Secretaries,
office machine operators, bank tellers, and phone operators are all expected to
experience absolute declines in employment. Only cashiers are growing faster
than the average for all occupations. The inference is that Leontief-Duchin
think that cashiers will be relatively unaffected by computer technology, while
the other clerical occupations will experience significant displacement.
Unlike the BLS model, Leontief-Duchin openly state their assumptions about
technological change and the subsequent impact that has on the staffing ratios
of the occupations. Therefore, it is possible to evaluate those assumptions
independently of the overall reasonableness of the projections. Given the much
slower than average growth for most of the clerical fields, at least some of
the staffing ratios for those jobs must be expected to fall rapidly. Thus, the
selected analysis of some of those assumptions is critical for this study.
The technological assumptions for secretaries and typists will be examined
in detail to illustrate the approach of Leontief and Duchin. According to
Leontief-Duchin (1984: 5.21), the direct impact of office automation on
particular occupations is based on the findings of case stUdies wherever
possible. In general they find that word processing equipment ·produces
remarkable gains in productivity when it -is properly selected and used. 11 (1984:
5.29) They reference an article in Administrative Management (no author, 1978:
Table 4.5
LEONTIEF-DUCHIN PROJECTED OCCUPATIONAL GROWTH, 1982-1995
DETAILED CLERICAL OCCUPATIONS
-
Decomposition of Clerical Employment Changes, 1982-1995
Employment Changes
Absolute Changes Percent of 1982 Employment
Occupation
Change in Change in Constant Other
1982 1995 Employment Employment Employment Structural Constant Other
Employment Employment 1982-1995 1982-1995 Shares Change* Employment Structural(thousands) (thousands) (thousands) (percent) (thousands) (thousands) Shares Change
.
Clerical 18.032 17.786 (246) -1.4 6.129 (6,375) 34.0 -35.4
Secretaries 4,951 4,592 (359) -7.2 1,683 (2.042) 34.0 -41.2
Office f-tachine
Operators 811 224 (587) -72.4 276 (863) 34.0 - 106.4
Bank Tellers . 494 404 (90) -18.2 168 (258) 34.0 -52.1
Phone Operators 355 356 1 0.3 121 (119) 34.0 -33.7
Cashiers 1,568 2,186 618 39.4 533 85 34.0 5.4
Other Clerical 9,853 10,024 171 1.74 3,349 (3,178) 34.0 -32.3
Total Employment 107.284 143.753 36.469 34.0
Source: Calculations by the author based on data kindly provided by Faye Ouchin.
Note: Totals and percentages may not add exactly due to OMission of some occupational detail and some sounding error.
*Other.structural change includes the combined effects of changes in staffing ratios and differential rates of industry growth.
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70-71) which concludes that word processing can increase output from 500 to
1,000 percent. They also suggest that several other studies support labor
savings of up to 50 percent -- Murphree (1981) in a Wall Street Legal firm and
Downing (1980). Finally, they cite Karon (1982) as conc~uding that word
processing equipment in one research organization reduced labor requirements by
20 percent.
Leontief and Duchin as~ume "that 100 percent of a typist's time will be
affected by word processing and that word processing technology will produce
labor savings of 80 percent. That amounts to a whopping 500 percent gain in
productivity for typists who use word processing equipment. Furthermore,
Leontief and Ouchin assume that word processing equipment produces only a
temporary increase in the amount of work that originators will request, which
can be eliminated through a properly managed installation. Thus, word
processi n9 creates no "new" work such as more revi si ons or more perfect
copies. All the assumed productivity gain adds "directly or indirectly to the
total output of the finn. II (1984: 5.30)
But, the capabilities of the microprocessor are ideally suited to redrafts,
more form letters, updated statistical reports, etc. Word processing is not
adopted simply to save labor time, i.e., to accomplish the same old work with
fewer workers, but because there is additional work that needs to be done.
Thus the production in the fiMm becomes more intensive in information content,
a trend which has been ongoing for many years.
The technological capability of word processing to save the time that a
secretary or typist would have spent doing the same work on a typewriter is
only one of the links in estimating the expected changes in staffing ratios. A
separate question is that of how many suc~ workers will have word processors,
in other words the diffusion of the technology. A 500 percent gain 1n labor
productivity by a small percentage of the workers will have little impact at
the aggregate level.
Leontief and Ouchin assume that the. 500 percent gain in labor productivity
from using word processing affects 100 percent of the tasks of typists and that
70 percent of all typists will have word processing by 1990. (1984: 5.31-32)
The assumptions are the same for secretaries except that only 24 percent of
them type full-time, while the remainder type 20 percent of the time. It
should be mentioned that there are separate assumptions about the adoption of
integrated office systems that link various devices together. These networks
will also decrease overall requirements for secretariese
In the Leontief-Duchin study, the diffusion rates for word processing
equipment are not influenced by industrial sector or by size of firm, i.e., the.
technology is assumed to diffuse steadily with the same impacts regardless of
indust~ or size of firm. In reality these assumptions may not be accurate.
For example, certain sectors such as insurance and banking are already"
significant users of electronic office technology. Thus some proportion of
secretaries and typists may already be using this equipment (before the base
period of the research study). Obviously they ~annot benefit a second time
from its introduction. Along a similar vein, it is possible that the work in
particular sectors is more amenable to electronic office technology. Examples
may be law offices where some types of legal briefs are repetitive except for a
few sections; and where a high premium is assigned to the correctness of
language used in each brief. In these sectors, just as in banking and
insurance, the new office technologies "may be more productive and hence spread
rapidly. On the other hand,. the situation may be more clouded in other
sectors, where the work tends to be more unique and less repetitive. It seems
logical that the productivity gains will vary widely depending on the precise
nature of the output of the office.
Finally, it is also possible that,the ·size of firm isa crucial variable in
determining the impacts of electronic office technology. The most obvious
example is the one-secretary office where the labor savings may free the
secretary to do other tasks but the firm has no intention of eliminating thisjob. Thus the hypothetical productivity gains do not reduce the actual number
of secretaries in such an environment. Ideally these positions would be
excluded from the calculations developed by Leontief and Ouchin.
Although size of fi~ and industry are not specifically accounted for by
Leontief and Ouchin, it can be argued that their estimates represent average
gains over a very long period of time. However, our judgment is that at best
the productivity gains anticipated by Leontief and Duchin are only possible for
tasks that are very repetitive and which therefore require little individual
attention~
In general, the Leontief-Ouchin model produces three different types of
projected occupational impacts. The first type (direct impacts) results from
stated assumptions about the spread of computer-based technologies and the
labor displacement potential of those technologies. The second type (indirect
impacts) results from the workings of the input-output model itself. They
represent the secondary impacts from the changes in investment· and labor demand
associated with the direct impacts. The third type "(unintentional impacts)
represent the forced growth of occupational demand in areas not substantially
affected by computer-based technologies.
We feel very str~ngly that to make the projections of the occupational
impact of computer-based technologies most useful for policy decisions, the
projections should be compared to an alternative state of the world that
represents a realistic baseline. Even a simple linear extrapolation of
historical employment trends by sector or occupation would provide a more
realistic baseline than the counterfactual assumption of no productivity gains
except those due to computer-based technologies.
While the Leontief-Duchin configuration may be useful as a modelfng device,
it obscures the true policy implications of the model. In fact, we think that
comparisons based on it may be seriously misleading to policymakers. For
policy purposes it is more important to focus on the marginal changes that will
result from a specific change or' treatment than to focus on the aggregate
change from an a1tern~tive state of the world that could never happen.
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It is i,mportant that the global scope of the results presented in the .
Leontief-Duchin study not conceal the fact that the actual assumptions about
the spread of computer-based technologies and the labor displacing impacts arejudgmental. This is not meant as a criticism in any way of the Leontief-Duchin
effort, but the elegance of the final presentation can mislead the unwa~ into
the mistaken impression that the model is responsible for the predictions. In
fact, the model is Si,lya tool to project the implications of the. stated
assumptions about the echnology. We feel that some of the assumptl0ns about
the spread of computer-based technologies are reasonable and some are not. It
1s natural that peOple ~ll differ 1n these judgments; what 1s important is
that it ·be clear' th'at, it is the assumptions that drive the model, not vice
versa.
In addition, ,we think that the changes they studied are not the only
changes that will take place, nor are they necessarily the most important
ones. The model does not address substitution among inputs based upon price
changes, or changes in final demand induced by price effects resulting from use
of the new technologies. Nor does it include scale economies and agglomeration
economies, both of which may be influenced directly by technological change.
This latter point may be particularly important since some experts expect
computer-based technologies to transfo~ the traditional manufacturing
environment.
There is also an important question about the degree of substitution among
different kinds of capital goods. It is not necessarily true that because an
industry adopts some form of a~tomation that it will achieve better than
average gains in productivity. The reason is that it may at the same time
reduce investments in other prOductivity-enhancing areas. In other words, the
new investment may simply be the current manifestation of labor-saving
technology that will help these firms to achieve productivity gains at the .
historic average. Resolution of this issue is of major importance in assessing
the ~ffects of computer-based technologies.
The Leontief-Duchin study represents a significant advance in modeling that
holds considerable promise for studying the employment implications of
technological change. It moves the field one step closer to a general
equilibrium model that could incorporate all direct and indirect influences on
employment that emanate from technological change or other structural change in
the economy. However, the true contribution of the Leontief-Duchin model to
understanding future occupational trends cannot yet be determined. The model
needs a more realistic baseline scenario. including trend values of
productivity increase by sector, to determine the marginal employment impacts
of computer-based technol'ogy.
C. Drennan Study
Matthew P. Drennan (1983) has explored the impacts of office automation on
clerical employment in six industries in "Implications of Computer and
Communications Technology for Less Skilled Service Employment Opportunities."
The industries examined were banking, credit agencies, securities, insurance.
business services, and miscellaneous services. The analysis of clerical
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employment uses the job classification system from the 1970 Census of
Population.
The Drennan study is both quantitative_and qualitative. The quantitative
portion of the study utilizes a variety of data sources, while the qualitative
portion is based on the author's interviews with a selected number of producers
and users of office automation. The review here is limited to the projections
methodology. used by Drennan and the impor~ant judgments and assumptions which
drive those projections.
The Drennan methodology utilizes simple extrapolation to forecast
industry-occupation employment to 1990. First·, industry employment in the six
industries from 1983 onward is assumed to grow at the historical average rate
experienced from,1969-1979. The assumption is that following the 1980-1982
recessionary period these industries will return to pre-recessionary growth
patterns. In addition, Drennan also includes an alternative 1990 forecast
which assumes a productivity growth rate that is .5 percentage points higher
per year in each industry than the historical average for those industries.
This allows for increased employment impacts of office automation in future
years.
Once the estimates for 1990 industry employment are obtained, then
employment by occupation in those industries is estimated by assuming that the
change in occupational staffing patterns from 1970 to 1978 will continue to
1990, what Drennan (1983: 88) call s a conti nuati on of ·more of the same. I' The
oc'cupational staffing patterns were obtained from the National
Industry-Occueation Ejg101ment Matrix, 1970, 1978, and Projected 1990 (Bureauof Labor Statlst1cs, 8 . In brief, the occupational employment estimates
for these six industries are derived from past changes in occupational staffing
patterns and past industry growth trends.
A brief summary of Drennan's overall projections are presented in Table
4.6. Since staffing ratios for clerical employment fell in these six
industries by nearly 3 percent from 1970 to 1978, the extrapolation indicates a
similar decline from 1978 to 1990. Total employment in these industries grew
70 percent from 1970 to 1978, but it is only expected to grow 44 percent from
1978 to 1990. This slower growth is presumably due to the interruption of
growth in these industries during the 1980-1982 recession. Since staffing
ratios are falling for clerical workers, clerical employment growth is much
slower than total employment growth in these industries. Drennan concludes(1983: 90):
The expectation of markedly slower employment growth
.in clerical jobs in those industries is fi~ly based and
is difficult to contest. 'The chief implication for the
labor force is the same as it was a decade ago: education
beyond secondary school is the key passport to job security
in the 1990s.
Table 4.6
DRENNAN: PROJ'CTED EMPLOYMENT BY OCCUPATION
IN SIX OFFICE INDUSTRIES
(thousands)
Alternative
1970 1978 1990 1990
Occupation Employment* Employment* Employment Employment
Professionals 1,005 1,595 2,611 2,458
Managers 814 1,176 1,755 1,637
Sales 577 770 1,015 950
Clericals 2,325 3,092 4,153 3,867
Other 705 l,OBI 1,620 1,611
Total 5,426- 7,714 11,156 10,525
*Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, The· National Industry-
Occupation Smployment Matrix, 1970-1978 and Projected 1990, Bulletin 2086,
April 1981.
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The strength of Drennan's simple extrapolation technique is that since.
these industries have been the leaders in office automation, the assumed
scenario is plausible if one thinks the past impacts of office automation will
continue in the future. The implication is that if the past is any guide to
the future for these industries, then clerical jobs will continue to grow, but
much slower than the average of all jobs in these industries. On the other
hand, it is easy to dismiss any extrapolation technique as too simplistic.
But, besides the rather obvious questions that can be directed at any
extrapolation methodology, there are a number of other concerns about Drennan's
projections.
First, it is clear that the alternative 1990 industry employment estimates,
which assume an additional .5 percent productivity growth, are not logically
related to any of the other data in the extrapolations. But it is
inconceivable that the extra productivity growth (which ranges from just under
20 percent to in excess of 100 percent depending on the industry) would not
lead to price declines which in turn would positively affect industry sales.
Our judgment is that it is not meaningful to fix demand and then vary
productivity to show that less labor would be needed if the existing workers
would only produce more. The arithmetic in these calculations is easy to do,
but in reality the growth in demand for these service industries has been
robust over the last decade or so. The strong implication is that price
declines would be accompanied by at least some increase in demand for the
products produced by those sectors.
Second, the assumption of the continuation of past trends in staffing
ratios appear to be contradicted to some extent by Drennan's own qualitative
analysis. According to him (1983: 69), managers employment will "experience a
marked curtailment of growth" in the years ahead. This slowdown will be due to
the diffusio~ of integrated office systems, where executives will be able to
cOl1lllunicate with each other electronically, access data bases and all other
software using desktop computers. Although Drennan points to several reasons
why these systems will not diffuse as rapidly as perhaps some experts think, it
is clear that he includes the alternative 1990 industry projections to
.incorporate the possibility of faster diffusion. But, even in the alternative
scenario, the productivity gains are spread out evenly over all occupations.
In summary, Drennan has forecast clerical jobs to 1990 in six industries.
He uses a simple extrapolation technique, after accounting for the lack of
growth during the 1980-1982 recession. There may be some problems in the data
used for the extrapolations, questions about the alternative employment growth
scenario, and some questions about the logical relationship between the
qualitative analysis and the quantitative extrapolations. Nonetheless, to the
extent that the past decade is a guide to the future for these industries, the
projections deserve serious consideration•.
D. Roessner Stugr
J. David Roessner and his colleagues at Georgia Tech have examined the
impact of office automation on clerical employment in two industries, banking
and insurance, in Impact of Office Automation on Office Workers (1984).
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Roessner stresses the need to extend current employment forecasts such as those
by BLS beyond 10 years. He (II, 1984: 2) also concludes that there are
weaknesses in existing employment forecasts, especially in the way in whichjobs are defined and the incorporation of technological change in the
projections methodology. The forecast horizon in the Roessner study extends to
the year 2000.
The Roessner study focuses on an explicit and systematic technology
assessment and forecast and the relationship of that forecast to occupational
employment. He describes his method as more of an engineering approach but one
that also takes account of economic considerations. (III, 1984: 4-5). He
stresses the importance of making the process as open and transparent as
possible to facilitate its use by others and to encourage improvements in the
methodology.
The Roessner study team (10 people) first internally developed a
time-phased technology forecast for office automation in banking and
insurance. This initial forecast was then distributed to officials from these
two industries who were asked to participate in a Delphi exercise designed to'
confi~/modify the original forecast. The Delphi methodology attempts to
develop a consensus forecast from iterative and independent polling of experts
in a given field. Roessner (III, 1984: 96-97) conducted two rounds of polling
of eight experts each in banking and insurance.
Space limitations prohibit reporting the full technology forecast, or
technology I'morphologyll as Roessner calls it (III, 1984: 46-5~). However, the
emphasis was on the identification of breakthrough technologies that might have
a significant impact on clerical employment. According to Roessner's
projections, there are two breakthrough technologies on the horizon that will
likely impact clerical employment in the 1990s, namely optical scan and voice
recognition systems and artificial intelligence (AI). The market for the
former devices, which will eliminate the human keying of data and text, will be
about $4 billion by 1992, and these systems will be in widespread use by that
year. The market for various types of AI systems will la~ that of voice
recognition; but by 1998 Roessner forecasts we will have se1f-generatingll
software (II, 1984: 8). As will be seen later, these two breakthrough
technologies will indeed have a significant impact on Roessner's projections of
clerical employment in the 1990s.
The second step in the Roessner methodology was to develop a task
characteristic/function matrix for each detailed clerical job using the job
classification system of BLS. For instance, the tasks of typing and data entry
might both be classified simply as the input function. The six functions
identified by Roessner were: input, processing, output, data base,
communications, and monitoring. According to him the advantage of the
functional teMmS is that they are independent of technologies currently 1n use.
The identification of the task/function matrices were essentiallyjudgmental (III, 1984: 73). The detailed BLS jobs were then grouped into
clerical job clusters by the similarity of their functions. Roessner used
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secondary sources .supp1emented by a small number of interviews and survey
questionnaires to determine the time clericals spend in each task/function.
The third step of the Roessner methodology was to conduct an industry
Delphi forecast to provide estimates of the impacts of office automation on the
structure of work. These estimates were not nearly as detailed as the task
characteristic/function matrix but were designed to identify in broad terms
different organizational structures and employment mixes that might prevail in
the future. They provide an input to the next step of the process, which
develops the estimated labor savings, plus they provide an independent llleans of
verifying or validating the final employment forecast itself.
The fourth step of the Roessner methodology was to actually estimate the
impact of office automation on the clerical job clusters using the functions of
those jobs developed earlier. It amounts to producing time-phased estimates of
labor savings due to the new technology. This was done internally by the study
team using a modified Delphi process which Roessner (III, 1984: 122) calls
"estimate-ta1k-estimate." The goal of the method was to gain consensus among
the study team about the various judgments which had to be made to
quantitatively estimate the labor savings for each job cluster.
The fifth step of the Roessner methodology was to generate the employment
forecasts for each of the clerical job clusters. These estimates used a base
year of 1980 and provided forecasts at five-year intervals to the year 2000.
Demand for the output of these industries, what Roessner calls "workload", is a
straight line extrapolation of value added in banking and insurance plus a
special output index in banking which was constructed from various deposit
transactions (II, 1984: 22).
The final step of the Roessner methodology is to conduct a sensitivity
analysis of the results and to validate those results. The primary validation
is to return to the industry Delphi forecast which identifies the general job
mixes and compare those with the more detailed approach. According to
Roessner, the two methods provide remarkably consistent employment estimates
(II, 1984: 27). For the sake of brevity, only the standard or most likely
estimates from the Roessner study are presented in this review.[23]
One of the most important set of summary estimates in the Roessner study
are those that pertain to the labor savings which are most likely to be
realized by the installation of office automation in banking and insurance.
These.estimates are actually the heart of the study; they summarize the
interaction of the technology forecast with the task/function matrix which
describes the job activities of clerical workers. Recall also that demand is a
simple extrapolation of past trends in these industries, so it is truly the
labor savings estimates which are novel and which drive the employment
projections.
23. This brief summary of the Roessner methodology does not do justice to its
complexity; there are actually many parts to each of the major steps.
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The' labor savings or productivity gains attributable to office automation
for each of the occupational clusters developed by Roessner are presented in
Table 4.7. Roessner states these in index number fo~ as the percent of the
1980 base time.required. Thus a falling index number indicates that the same
amount of work in the specified future year can be accomplished in less time
than in the base year, 1980. These labor savings estimates are quite similar
across the job clusters and even across the two industries. Thus the
productivity gain for Filing Data Ent~ Clerks is almost the same as that for
Receptionists/Telephone Operators.
The strong implication is that individual clerical occupations will not
change much in relative importance from 1980 to 2000. Roessner (IV, 1984: 145)
acknowledges that some readers might be surprised at the homogeneity of the
results across occupations. But he suggests one interpretation of the
findings:
One possibility is that this surprisingly even, across-the-
board projected reduction in clerical time per work function
will prove accurate because market forces will act to stimulate
new technological development to improve productivity evenly
across clerical activities. For instance, while automation of
structured input is commencing earlier than automation of
unstructured input, that very gap may accentuate efforts to
bring technologies such as voice recognition to market. There
appear to be relatively few work functions that are "safe" from
a substantial degree of automation.
Again, if Roessner's projections are correct, all clerical jobs will be
impacted similarly by office automation, in the short run as well as the long
run.
-
A summary of Roessner's employment forecast for banking and insurance is
presented in Table 4.8. The overall demand or workload forecast is presented
first; it is the linear extrapolation of demand referred to earlier, stated as
the number of workers required assuming no productivity gains (1980 base).
That is followed by the presentation of the overall productivity gains for
clerical workers, what Roessner calls the percent reduction due to technology.
Third, the estimated clerical workforce required to accomplish the projected
workload is derived, i.e., the employment projections. Finally, for purposes
of explanation, the annual average productivity gains for each five-year period
are presented.
The data in Table 4.8 illustrate the major conclusions of the Roessner
study. He expects a drastic curtailment of the growth of clerical jobs in
banking and insurance, which will tend to accelerate in the 1990s. By the year
2000 there will be fewer clerical workers in banking and insurance than there
were in 1980. Although only the results from the most likely scenario are
presented in this review, employment declines are projected by Roessner even
for the most conservative technological assumptions (III, 1984: 149). It
Table 4.7
ROESSNER: PERCENT OF 1980-BASE TIME REQUIRED BY
OCCUPATIONAL CLUSTER, HOST LIKELY SCENARIO FOR BANKING AND INSURANCE
Occupational Cluster 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Banking
Computation/Bookkeeping Clerks 100.00 92.75 81.73 63.36 42.10
General Office Clerks 100.00 92.75 81.56 63.36 42.03
Typists/Word Processor Operators 100.00 94.00 83.29 66.25 45.86
Secretary/Administrative Assistants 100.00 93.62 82.15 65.61 - 46.01
Filing/Data Entry Clerks 100.00 92.44 80.82 61.42 39.07
Information Retrieval/
Communications Clerks 100.00 92.35 80.33 61.37 40.06
Mail Handlers 100.00 92.71 80.76 63.64 42.25
Clerical Supervisors 100.00 93 ..39 82.46 65.75 46~71
Receptionists/Telephone Operators 100.00 92.23 79.40 60.94 39.30
Computer/Office Equipment Operators 100.00 91.69 80.47 61.58 39.42
Tellers 100.00 92.22 60.92 61.79 38.80
Information Maintenance Clerks 100.00 92.96 81.45 63.24 4, Q60
Insurance
Computation/Bookkeeping Clerks 100.00 92.52 81.57 62.89 42.00
General Office Clerks 100.00 92.76 . 81.37 63.28" - 42.31
Typists/Word Processor Operators 100.00 94.10 83.42 67.02 47.37
Secretary/Administrative Assistants 100.00 93.38 82.15 64.93 44.71
Filing/Data Entry Clerks 100.00 92.55 81.21 61.77 40.12
Infonmation Retrieval/
Communications Clerks 100.00 92.66 80.38 61.27 38.96
Mail Handlers 100.00 92.61 80.88 63.49 41.51
Clerical Supervisors 100.00 93.76 82.81 65.96 46.47
Receptionists/Telephone Operators 100.00 92.10 79.39 60.34 39.29
Computer/Office Equipment Operators 100.00 92.02 80.99 61.89 39.43
Source: J.-Oavid Roessner, Impact of Office Automation on Office Workers, Volume IV,
Appendices. prepared for the Employment and Training Administration. U.S. Department of
Labor. April 1984, Appendix P, Runs II and lSI.
Table 4.8
ROESSNER: SUMMARY EMPLOYMENT PROJECTIONS
FOR BANKING AND INSURANCE, MOST LIKELY SCENARIO
Item 1980 1985 19.90 1995 2000
Banking
Clerical Workload Forecast (employees x 1,000) 1,100 1,326 1,551 1,781 2,001
Percent Reduction Due to Technology 0.0 7.37 18.67 37.05 58.81
Clerical Workforce Required (employees x 1.000) 1,100 1,228 1.261 1,121 824
Average Annual Productivity Gain for Each
Five-Year Period
--- 1.474 2.260 3.676 4.352
Insurance
Clerical Workload Forecast (employees x 1,000) 924 1,024 1.124 1.225 1.324
Percent Reduction Due to Technology 0.0 1.07 18.28 36.30 ·57.09
Clerical Workforce Required (employees x 1.000) 924 952 919 780 568
•Average Annual Productivity Gain for Each-
Five-Year Period
--- 1.414 2"242 3.604 4.158
Source: J. David Roessner, Impact of Office Automation on Office Workers, Volume IV, Agpendices, prepared for the
Employment and Training Administration. u.s. Department of labor, April 1984. Appendix • Runs II and lSI.
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. should be clear that if 'demand increases linearly, while the productivity gains
from office ·automation accelerate over the 20 years of the projection period in
an exponential fash.ion, then the logical result must be an accelerating decl ine
in clerical employment.
But the truth is that the Roessner projections may not be any more usable
by policymakers than those by Leontief-Duchin. Whatever the merits of the
Roessner methodology, the results do not appear to describe real world events.
This conclusion ;s demonstrated· by Table 4.9 which presents the actual BLS
staffing ratios for ;selected clerical occupations for 1970 and 1978 1n the
banking industry. In so far as possible Roessner's,occupat10nal clusters have
been related to the BLS system. The match 1s at least roughly consistent for 8
of the 12 occupational clusters. Actually, the match is not nearly as
important as simply noting how dramatic the actual changes in staffing ratios
were. From 1970 to 1978 the changes in staffing ratios for the selected
clerical occupations presented in Table 4.9 ranged from -60 percent to +115
percent.
Yet Roessner asserts that the relative importance of individual clericaljobs will not change much in the future. Back-office jobs such as file clerks
have been declining in relative importance for a long time, while
computer-related positions have been increasing dramatically in relative
importance. Absent a complete break with histo~, clerical occupations can be
'expected to continue to rise and fall at differential rates.
There appear to be three major problem areas in the Roessner study which
have contributed to the counter-intuitive conclusions about the likely relative
importance of clerfca1 jobs in banking and insurance in the future. These same
problems may also have contributed to Roessner's overall pessimistic outlook
for clerical jobs in these two industries. Each problem area is discussed
briefly in turn.
First, there is no consideration of a whole host of investment questions or
the possibility that the info~ation content of output will increase. Like
Drennan, it is presumed that the epoch making gains in productivity
attributable to office automation will not alter the linear increase in demand
for the output of banking or insurance. Such an assumption mey be acceptable
for a sector like agriculture when we already have enough foodstuffs to eat.
But it is not appropriate to apply that assumption to services. Again, a more
reasonable position is that productivity gains of the magnitude expected by
Roessner would lead to price declines which in turn would surely expand the
markets for those services.
It should also be mentioned that the changes envisioned by Roessner may not
only save labor but they may also be the catalyst for the development of
entirely new products within banking and insurance. Although it appears to be
impossible to identify those new products in advance, banking and insurance
have offered innovative services in the past and will likely continue to do so
in the future. To the extent that new products and services are developed,
they will tend to mitigate any employment declines from office automation.
Table 4.9
STAFFING RATIOS FOR SELECTED CLERICAL POSITIONS IN BANKING
BASED UPON THE NATIONAL INDUSTRY-OCCUPATION EMPLOYMENT MATRIX,
1970 AND 1978. GROUPED BY ROESSNER'S OCCUPATIONAL CLUSTERS
Percent Change in
Occupation Staffing Ratios,
~'. (Roessner/BLS) 1970 1978 1970-1978
Typi sts/Wo·rd "Processor Operators
Ty.pi sts 2.94 2.24 - 23.8
Secretaries/Administrative Assistants
Secretari es 6.93 6.28 - 9.4
Filing/Data Entry Clerks
File Clerks 1.27 .96 - 24.4
Keypunch Operators 1.78 1.27 - 28.7
t~ai 1 Handlers
Mail Handlers .62 .57
-
801
Messengers .63 .46 - 27.0
Clerical Supervisors
Clerical Supervisors .73 .80 + 9.6
Receptionists/Telephone Operators
Reception; sots .60 .56
-
6.7
Telephone Operators .45 .18
- 60.0
Computer/Office Equipment Operators
Computer Operators 1.26 2~·72 . +115.9
Duplicating Machine Operators .• 03 .03 0.0
Banking
Tellers
Tellers 26.27 30.28 + 15.3
Total Clerical 64.77 64.50 - 0.3
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, The National
Industry-Occupation Employment Matrix, 1970, 1978, and Projected 1990,
yolume I, 1981, p. 289.
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It is also bothersome that Roessner appears to allow for no slack or
slippage of any kind in calculating the productivity gains. Organizations and
the technologies which they use do not fit together perfectly; there tend to be
bottlenecks and downtime. Most important of all. it is well-known that the
potential labor savings of any technology may not actually be realized in
fact. It is unknown if Roessner implicitly accounted for these factors. but
his estimates appear so optimistic that he may not have accounted for them
sufficiently.
The second major problem area in the Roessner study is in the task/function
matrix. Economists have been looking for an objective way to define jobs for a
long time. But job content tends to be very amorphous. That i s one of the
reasons why the OES system now in use at BLS concentrates on job titles. The
definition of jobs. whether by task characteristics. or Roessner's functions,
. or by any other means. tends to be a moving target which is impossible to hit
squarely. The functions identified by Roessner may be so general (input, data
processing, etc.) that they do not truly describe job activities in a
meaningful way. In short, there is a possibility that Roessner's task/function
matrix may have introduced a homogeneity across jobs that does not exist in
reality. This problem was then compounded by the aggregation of those
occupations into job clusters.
. The·final problem area in the Roessner stuQy may be in the technology
forecast itself. Roessner concludes that it is important to extend these
forecasts beyond 10 years, M••• to anticipate major changes in time for policy
machinery to move and related institutions to adjust.'1 (11. 1984: 34). However
desirable Roessner's goal may be, it probably cannot be achieved.
History is littered with technological forecasts which turned out to be
false or at best only partially true. while other radical changes were not
foreseen at all. Artificial intelligence 1s not a new technology; there were
high hopes for it 1n the early 1960s (Winston. 1985: 75-78). Many experts also
thought that various types of electronic funds transfer would replace paper
transactions by the early 1980s. Indeed. a recent study of the financial
services sector by the Office of Technology Assessment, Congress of the United
States, begins by acknowledging that past technology forecasts for this sector
have not been particularly accurate (1984: 7).
Our judgment is that the state of the art 1n technology forecasting is not
sufficiently advanced to penmit the kind of long-run analysis performed by
Roessner; even la-year forecasts of occupational employment stretch our current
forecasting abilities. Indeed, Roessner's attempt to identify so-called
II breakthrough" technologies vividly demonstrates the problems of extending the
forecast horizon beyond 10 years. Our knowledge becomes so limited that it is
easy to imagine greater and greater change. Extending the forecast horizon
removes all of the constraints that logically hinder the development and
diffusion of new technologies. All the rigors of the marketplace such as
competing products and other investment goals evaporate. Problems that
inevitably arise with new technology but are not known until it is implemented,
simply do not exist in these long-run projections. Uncooperative consumers who
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do not wish to use the new technologies are ignored. What remains is the
euphoria about what tomorrow's technologies will be able to accomplish.
Stated differently,employment projections beyond 10 years require
knowledge about technological breakthroughs,- ~theamount of time itwil-l take to
bring the new systems to the marketplace, the rate at which the technology will
diffuse or be adopted by finms, the organizational structure and the structure
of jobs in those firms, and the specific jobs which will be affected by those
new technologies. All this presumes that the products being produced with the
new technologies will be deemed desirable by conSUller5 and that it is known
which of these goods will be purchased through import markets. Furthermore,
all of this knowledge of the future must be precisely time-phased to properly
estimate the occupational impacts.
Roessner says that new public policy initiatives should not be taken on the
basis of only one study. But, his emphasis on breakthrough technologies
coupled to his long-run projections horizon raise some fundamental questions
about forecasting and its relation to policymaking. Are we willing to commit
public funds to correct for problems which have not yet actually arisen? How
many tax dollars do we spend retraining clerical workers in banking and
insurance because some day in the future voice recognition and artificial
intelligence may eliminate their jobs? What jobs do we train these workers
for? Do we train real people for jobs that don't yet exist, but may exist
after the technological breakthroughs occur? What do we do with them in the
meantime? How many problems that might develop in the future can we as a
society afford to solve now?
Roessner's long-run employment projections cannot be taken seriously as a
practical guide for policymaking. In the short run the projections appear to
contradict the best current evidence available about the uneven impacts of new
technologies on occupations. In the long run (beyond 10 years) virtually any
technological event is possible, so it is unwise to seriously shape public
policy now for events which mayor may not occur. There will be Ittechnological
surprises" in the years ahead just as there have been in the past. No one (or
group) has the immense amount of insight necessary to predict detailed
occupational employment in the long run sufficiently precisely that it ;s
possible to-develop a consensus view of what public policy should b~ today.
E. Summary
In this section the major existing forecasts of the impacts of office
automation on clerical employment have been reviewed. Although there appear to
be great disparities between the forecasts of BLS, Leontief-Di.lchin, Drennan,
and Roessne~, there is broad agreement that clerical jobs will not continue
their rapid growth of the past few decades.
Except for Roessner, there is also broad agreement that the so-called back
office jobs will continue to be automated first, slowing their growth
dramatically. These jobs appear to be more structured and repetitive,
therefore more subject to automation. This represents the continuation of a
long historical trend that has its roots in the manufacturing ~ector but will
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apply to computer and office electronic technology as well. Computer
technology is still not ready to tackle the unstructured situations where
humans excel, however.
On a more positive note, there will likely continue to be strong growth in
relative terms for computer-related clerical positions for the foreseeable
future and more or less average growth for clerical positions that directly
interface with customers or other co-workers. Many of these latter positions,
though not all, are more generalist in nature. Roessner notwithstanding, a
variety of skills probably helps to insure that the automation of anyone of
those skills leaves the job intact. It also implies that a worker can in
effect purchase job insurance by possessing numerous skills.
The methodologies of these studies are very different, but they share one
important characteristic which should not be overlooked. Regardless of the
modeling used, it is the technology forecast, its presumed relationship to
specific occupations, and the demand outlook that drives any employment
impacts. Too often it appears that somehow the model itself produced the
results, whereas in reality it is the assumptions which determine the results.
In this regard it is important to applaud the openness of the work of
Leontief-Duchin, Drennan, and Roessner. An evaluation of their studies would
be virtually impossible without the explicit reporting of their technological
assumptions. BLS is currently much less open about their handling of
technological change. The mathematical decomposition was used to estimate the
quantitative change in the staffing ratios in the industry-occupation matrix.
These are the most visible sign of the specific occupational impacts of
technological change in the BLS system. The results showed that BLS is indeed
changing the staffing ratios, but they do not report the basis of their
jUdgme~ts which guide the process.
Doubts have been expressed about the long-run technology forecasts of
Leontief-Duchin and Roessner, especially in regards to detenmining the
occupational impacts thereof. It is not necessary to repeat the details of
these arguments. Suffice it to say that it is far easier to calculate simple
labor-savings based on engineering concepts than to specify and quantify the
new jobs which will be c~eated by a growing, Qynamic economY. Furthermore, if
history is any guide, our abilities to calculate theoretical labor-savings
exceed our ability to actually achieve those savings in practice. Bela Gold,
an economist who has studied technological change for over 25 years, concludes(1981: 91) that even major technological changes have "fa11en far short of
their expected effects."
Absolute declines in total clerical emplo~nt for the foreseeable future
are extremely unlikely. Even more significantly, shaping public policy today
because of the chance that clerical jobs may "decline in the future is sheer
folly. The most likely scenario for the future is that clerical jobs will
continue to grow, but more slowly than the average for all jobs.
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v. CONCLUSIONS
The focus of this paper has been (1) to review the trends in clerical
employment over the last 30 years and (2) to assess the existing forecasts for
clerical jobs. Of particular concern has been the potential impact of office
automation on these job$. Although it is impossible to develop a new forecast
for clerical jobs based on this review, we have tried to be forthright with our
own judgntents along the way. Now it is tinae to bring together the various
themes of the paper.
A•. The Data Problems
The most obvious problem is that there is a scarcity of data on which to
base the assessment of clerical jobs and office automation. Time series data
are not available on office automation spending by industry or even detailed
clerical employment by industry. Hunt and Hunt (1985) recommended in another
paper, which critically assessed the data available to study the employment
effects of technological change, that highest priority should be given to the
establishment of a new, integrated data base capable of dealing simultaneously
with the employment and technology issues.
We have tried to openly state the data problems in this paper. Some may
think we have gone too far in this. But it is important to remember how easy
it is to utilize data which look similar on the surface, and end up drawing
inferences which reflect nothing more than differences in measurement. The
existing data are so fragmentary and so uneven that conclusions drawn from them
may always be tenuous.
We have done our best to insure that· the data reported in this paper are
reasonably consistent. Undoubtedly, some will object that time series data
were not developed for all clerical occupations or that the analysis halts
abruptly in 1982 in some cases. Suffice it to say that we endeavored to avoid
reporting results which might be misleading, but yet to get as much from
existing data sources as possible.
Another problem encountered in this effort was that a number of separate
influences occurred simultaneously in 1982 which make it extremely difficult to
interpret recent occupational employment trends. First, the bottom of the
worst recession since World War II occurred in 1982. This distorted the
employment figures in a number of w~s. Second, at about this same time there
appeared to be some real changes occurring in the patterns of growth across
different industries. This is particularly evident for state and local
government and perhaps hospitals. Third, it ;s possible that office automation
had diffused sufficiently to make some real impact by 1982. Finally, among the
data problems alluded to earlier, it turns out that 1982 was the last year in
which the CPS used the 1970 census classification system for occupations.
Since the data from 1983 and 1984 utilize such a different occupational
structure, even at the major group level, it is extremely difficult to conduct
meaningful analyses across this time span.
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Of course, the problem is that the confluence of these events, some real
and some artifacts of the data, make it very difficult to determine what the
recent trends have been. The employment of secretaries fell slightly in 1981
and 1982. That is very unusual, even during a recession. Did office
automation cause the decline? Was it simply that this recession was the worst
since World War II? Or did some other factor such as changing utilization ofjob titles or some technical problem with the survey cause the fall? These
questions cannot be answered with confidence, but the growth of secretarial
employment resumed in 1983 and, 1984. This argues that the decline was probably
due to the recession. The point is that it may be all too easy to draw false
inferences about the last few years.
B. Trends in Clerical Employment
The data problems notwithstanding, the aggregate analysis of all clerical.jobs clearly showed that the growth of this major occupational group has slowed
relative to the growth of all jobs. In particular, it appears that the
proportion of clerical jobs in total employment did not increase during the
1980-82 recession as it has in other recessions.
The decomposition analysis put clerical occupational growth into a larger
perspective. It emphasized the role of economic growth in determining the
fortunes of individual occupations. It was also seen that the growth of
particular industries (the changing sectoral composition of output) can have a
significant impact on occupational employment. In the long run there is no
doubt that the evolution of the service econo~ has been a favorable influence
on clerical employment levels.
The occupational decomposition also showed how changing staffing ratios can
influence occupational employment. Not·only has industry mix been positive for
clericals, but it seems that goods and services have been growing more
information-intensive per unit of output. This has also boosted clerical
employment. In addition, by showing how different the staffing ratios really
are across industries, the analysis reinforced the notion that industry
structure cannot be ignored in studying occupational employment.
Of course, it is the changes in staffing ratios that best summarize the
impacts of technological change on occupations. It was found that from 1972 to
1982 the net effect on clerical employment of changing staffing ratios was
modestly positive across all industries, but there were a few sectors, notably
finance, where the effect was negative. This is taken as evidence of the
adverse impact of technological change on clerical employment. Even in
finance, however, the strong industry mix effect and overall economic growth
overwhelmed the displacement effect of falling staffing ratios. So. employment
of clericals continued to rise significantly despite the impact of automation.
In general, the results of the analysis for individual occupations were
disappointing. The amazing variety of clerical jobs was depicted, and the
diversity in their employment trends clearly emerged from the analysis. But
the trends in employment proved to be very difficult to tie conclusively to'
technological change or any other single cause. The general conclusion was
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that this aggregate analysis of occupational employment data was not sufficient
to reveal the causes behind the trends.
The attempt to find empirical evidence on the productivity gains from
office automation was also-relatively unsatisfying. What is available consists
of mostly undocumented trade journal articles which are hard to take
seriously. It was shown that the measured productivity gains in finance and
insurance did not support the thesis that office automation was having a
significant impact. Yet it is true that investment in this sector has been
dramatically higher than the historical average for that sector for the last 15
years. In addition, clerical staffing ratios have declined in finance, so this
lack of measured productivity results remains a puzzle. In general, ourjudgment is that there does not appear to be much empirical evidence of
dramatic productivity gains due to office automation at this time. Some
possible explanations for these results are offered later.
c. The Forecasts of Clerical Employment
The most obvious question in looking at forecasts of clerical employment
growth is whether or not the recent slowdown in the growth of clerical jobs
will continue 1n the years ahead. ~n this regard, all four of the forecasts
reviewed in this paper concur that the slowdown is permanent.
BLS·anticipates average growth for clerical jobs through 1995, with
modestly declining staffing ratios just about offset by the favorable industry
mix of these jobs. The projections offered by Leontief-Duchin, Roessner, and
Drennan all foresee that office automation will have more negative impacts on
clerical workers than those expected by BLS. Leontief-Duchin and Roessner
expect an absolute decline in the need for clericals in the next decade or so.
Our judgment, however, is that these two studies are too pessimistic about the
outlook for clerical jobs.
Before proceeding to a critical discussion of these forecasts, it is
important to emphasize the value of this research. First, all three of these
studies carefully state their assumptions about technological change. In this
regard their approach is completely open and subject to scrutiny by others.
BLS, on the other hand, has been much less open about the technological
assumptions implicit in its methodology. That is one of the reasons that the
decomposition analysis was applied to the projections of BLS. That analysis
showed clearly that BLS substantially alters some of the staffing ratios in
making its forecasts, but currently it is virtually impossible to determine why
those changes were made. In our opinion it is important for BlS to provide
more information about the basis for their jUdgments.
Second, there is a clear need to explore alternatives and supplements to
the BLS methodology. Roessner, for example, recognizes that his method is far
too complex and expensive to apply econ~-wide. He suggests the in-depth
stuqy of selected industries, ~ere it is expected that technological change
will have the greatest impact. In any event, there is no doubt that we need to
explore new ways of forecasting the jobs of the future.
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There are a variety of "reasons that support our contention that
Leontief-Duchin and Roessner are too pessimistic in their outlook for clerical
employment. First, it is important to note that Leontief-Duchin actually use
the BLS demand forecast in their research, whereas both Drennan and Roessner
use simple extrapolation methods to obtain estimates of demand for their
studies. What this means is that demand is expected to grow as it has in the
past, but the impacts of technological change (i.e., office automation) will be
much different than they were previously. The revolution 1n office automation
will leave the demand side of the marketplace unchanged.
But that is not the way a complex, dynamic market economy operates. If
office automation were adopted rapidly, it should reduce the relative costs of
production for those goods and services which are intensive users of office
automation. Those lower production costs will in turn tend to lead ta lower
prices. But, there is every reason to think that lower prices will generate
additional demand for the goods and services in question. This will tend to
increase employment levels as well.
This scenario is even more plausible when one realizes that the product
markets are not static. So the new electronic office technologies may
themselves provide the impetus for the development of entirely new goods and
services. Industry interrelationships may change or scale economies may be so
significant that they fuel the development of a mass market that heretofore was
undreamed of. In our opinion it is inappropriate to fix demand or the growth
of demand and then assume a revolutionary change on the supply side of the
market. Obviously, such a partial analysis can create false impressions about
the true impacts of office automation.
Second, it appears that none of these other stUdies account for the
tendency of output to become more information-intensive over time. Yet this is
a process which has been occurring for a long time. The production recipes for
many different goods and services today require more information processing
than yesterday. This is not simply a function of the changing composition of
demand, but relates to the composition of a standard unit of output. To the
extent that this trend continues in the future, it implies that office
automation may have less impact on clerical employment levels than anticipated
by some researchers.
It should also be mentioned once again that office automation is likely to
lower the marginal cost of some new types of work so much that the required
labor input rises by more than the impact of the new techniques themselves.
The common example is redrafts of documents with word processing. The
probability that this will occur may be enhanced by our inability to measure
output from offices in the first place. This type of new work or rework is
explicitly rejected by Leontief-Duchin, and perhaps implicitly by Roessner.
Third, these studies do not account for the fact that the new technologies
must be cost-effective and relatively reliable for widespread application. The
technologies may appear to be costless, producing quantum leaps in productivity
for the users. Yet there are both installation costs and ongoing costs that
must be accounted for in addition to the purchase price. The ongoing costs
63
include system maintenance, software development, personnel training, and
others. There is also the cost of unscheduled downtime. which may become even
more significant with integrated systems.
Leontief-Duchin and Roessner appear to us to be truly overoptimistic
technologically, both 1n tenms of office automation equipment capabilities and
in the speed of diffusion of that equipment. Leontief-Duchin assume that word
processors alone will produce productivity gains for typists and secretaries of
500 percent. Yet this ass~ption is based upon a short trade journal article
which is five times more optimistic than the other articles which
Leontief-Duchin reference. Roessner. on the other hand. emphasized the
potential for two' breakthrough technologies, voice input and artificial
intelligence. He assumes that innovations will occur in these technologies in
the years ahead, they will be successfully marketed, and they will dramatically
reduce clerical employment 1n banking and insurance during the 19905.
Our major complaint with the technological assumptions of both
Leontief-Duchin and Roessner is not just that they may be technically wrong,
although there is ample reason to question them. but that the level of
uncertainty about the technical forecast is so great that interpretation of the
occupational employment forecasts which are derived from them becomes little
more than an academic exercise. Does anyone seriously wish to base policy
decisions on a forecast of the capabilities of artificial intelligence, a
technology which has been kicking around research labs since the 1950s?
Perhaps we will always be optimistic about new technologies; it seems to be
part of the human condition. But that is no justification to shape public
policy based on our dreams of the future.
Suffice it to say that we are unconvinced that technology will evolve as
far or as fast as Leontief-Duchin and Roessner predict. But even if it does,
the· derivative employment impacts foreseen by these researchers may still be
very far off the mark. The overgeneralization to broad employment impacts
based on assumptions about labor productivity at the task or fiMm level is very
dangerous. This is the kind of analysis that leads to the fear that we will
experience massive technological unemployment at some point in the future.
Various analysts have been predicting such an event at least since the dawn of
the industrial age. Somehow the employment apocalypse is alw~s just ahead,
yet thankfully we never quite reach it. In any event, when evaluating these
studies it is important to remember that the model simply processes the
technological assumptions about the econo~. It is the technological
assumptions that drive the employment impacts in these studies.
Because of the uncertainties about future demand and the capabilities of
future technologies, we would encourage a focus on shorter range occupational
forecasting, exactly the opposite approach being suggested by Leontief-Duchin
and Roessner. Roessner s~s that public policymakers need a longer time period
for planning. But. if technological change 1s occurring faster tod~, then it
is becoming even more impossible to develop long-run employment forecasts.
Surely it is folly to think that we can peer 15 to 20 years into the future and
see the detailed occupational and industrial s~ructure of this nation. In
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fact, we think that the current BLS efforts, which produce about a la-year
planning horizon, tax existing forecasting abilities to the limit.
D. The Outlook for Clerical Employment
What has this review shown for the future of clerical jobs? First, we
think the pessimists are wrong who claim that these jobs will either stop
growing absolutely or actually decline. The forces of economic growth, the
shift toward services, the current limitations of office automation
technologies, all argue strongly against this scenario.
However, it is clear that the historical rate of growth of clerical jobs
has slowed. Clericals did not benefit from the last recession as they have in
earlier recessions, nor are some of the sectors that are important employers of
clericals growing as fast as they once were. Finally, although office
automation may not be producing a revol.ution, it should at least contribute to
the slowing of employment growth in these occupations in the future. We think
that the overall growth of clerical jobs in the future will be average to
slightly below average.
The common wisdom today is that the back office jobs will go away. We
think this ;s a glittering generality, but there is an analogy to manufacturing
which may be useful. Automation has not caused the total elimination of
production workers in manufacturing, but these jobs have not been increasing in
absolute terms for 40 years either. We think the so-called back office jobs,
to the extent that you can truly identify them, are more threatened by
automation than other positions. They share with production workers a
routinization of tasks which tends to support automation. This will not
necessarily lead to their demise, but their growth will probably be well below
average.
As mentioned earlier in this paper, it is definitely much easier to provide
a technological explanation for declining occupations than growing
occupations. There is an important message here. It is far easier to identify
the impacts of labor-saving technology than the new jobs which are created by a
growing, dynamic econo~. Technology is only one aspect of economic growth,
whereas the examination of the potential job losses is much more narrow and
focused.
Many people today are ready to add bank tellers to the list of declining
occupations. Unfortunately tellers are one of the occupations for which the
time series data are especially poor, but it does appear that the growth of
this occupation has slowed in recent years. It .also appears that to some
extent the future growth pro~pects for bank tellers is directly tied to the
public's acceptance of automatic teller machines. But these machines today are
being used mostly for withdrawals and most customers do not think of them as a
substitute for a fully staffed bank. Furthermore, it is difficult to know if
and when the public will be willing to break the human link in making banking
transactions. As a result, the future for bank tellers is extremely cloudy.
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Roessner notwithstanding, we think that the growth of technology related
positions will continue to be rapid, particularly clerical computer positions.
Office automation is not sufficiently advanced at this point to slow the growth
of these jobs. It remains to be seen if that will ever occur. We also think
that those clerical positions which require the worker to interface with
customers will likely experience average growth or better. The office of the
future will require both "high-tech" and "high-touch". Except possibly for
bank tellers, there appears to be more emphasis on customer service and the
quality of that service. .
Secretaries fall somewhere between the back-office jobs and those positions
which involve considerable customer interface. Therefore, secretarial
employment growth may slow but these jobs will not go away. It;s also true
that many of these positions are generalist in nature and more difficult to
threaten with automation. It seems clear that the secretaries of the future
will require a greater variety of skills and will utilize much more capital
equipment. We think that the growth of secretarial jobs will be average to
slightly below average, but the absolute number of these jobs will definitely
increase.
In summary. there ;s no persuasive evidence today that there will be a
significant,decline in clerical jobs in the future. The forecasts of declining
clerical employment are based on overoptimistic expectations of technological
improvements or exaggerated productivity claims on behalf of existing
technology.. In our opinion, current office technology offers significant
improvements in product quality and modest improvements in productivity. There
is as yet no empirical evidence of an office productivity revolution that will
displace significant numbers of clerical workers.
On the contrary. we think there are many factors which will contribute to
the job growth of clericals in the future. Chief among these is the simple
fact that clericals are so diffused in the national econo~. Moreover. to the
extent that clerical jobs are concentrated in particular industries, it has
been in sectors growing faster than average. Therefore. even allowing for
negative employment impacts from office automation, it is extremely difficult
to believe that the growth of this large, diverse. and diffused major
occupational group could be much below the average growth for all occupations
for the next decade.
\
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